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The Rights to a Fair Trial
and to Examine Witnesses Under
the Spanish Constitution and
the European Convention
on Human Rights
by DENNIS P. RIORDAN*
I. Introduction
The proper role of federal authority in the protection of funda-
mental rights and liberties has been a focus of debate in this country
since its inception.' That debate intensified in the wake of the Civil
War, when passage of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution bestowed upon citizens constitutional protections
against the power of state and local governments.2 The manner and
* Partner, Riordan and Rosenthal. B.A., Colgate University, 1970; J.D., New York
University School of Law, 1974. The research conducted in Spain for this article was made
possible by two Fulbright fellowships: the first from the U.S. - Spanish Joint Committee
for Cultural and Educational Cooperation underwrote an eight month stay in 1987; the
second, awarded by the Commission for Cultural, Educational, and Scientific Exchange
between the United States and Spain, was divided between the summers of 1995 and 1997.
The author deeply appreciates the interest and respect between the governments of the
United States and Spain which is reflected in their joint support of scholarly research. He
also thanks Professors Bernardo Del Rosal Blasco and Maria Jose Segura Garcia of the
Law Faculty of the University of Alicante, without whose invaluable professional assist-
ance and boundless personal kindness this article would not have been completed.
In 1987, during his first Fulbright fellowship, the author had the honor of meeting with
Francisco Tomas y Valiente. Don Tomas y Valiente was one of the original members of the
Spanish Constitutional Tribunal and its president during the Barberd decision in 1991.
Upon finishing his term on the court in 1992, he returned to his former life as a professor
of law. On February 14, 1996, he was assassinated in his office at the University Autonoma
of Madrid by an ETA gunman. The author dedicates this article to the memory of Don
Tomas y Valiente.
1. For a recent description of the controversy surrounding the enactment of the Bill
of Rights, as well as the failed effort of James Madison to include within those initial
amendments a constitutional prohibition on interference by the states with the rights of
conscience, freedom of the press, and the right to trial by jury, see JACK N. RAKOVE,
OroiNAL MEANINGS: POLMCS AND IDEAS IN =HE MAKING OF rsm CONSTrrLON 288-
338 (1996).
2. For recent Supreme Court opinions revisiting aspects of that debate, see City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (discussing legislative conflicts accompanying passage
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the degree to which our Federal Supreme Court, under the aegis of
constitutional interpretation, can and should nationalize legal norms
and mandate their application by all levels of government remain is-
sues as controversial today as anytime during the past two centuries.3
Questions concerning the enforcement of constitutional rights pit
two competing interests: the nation's effort to ensure a threshold of
liberty and fair treatment to all of its citizens wherever they may re-
side, and the interest of those same citizens in state and municipal
institutions that tailor substantive rules or procedures to localized
needs and desires, rather than to the mandate of a distant centralized
power. Conflict over the proper balance to strike between these com-
peting values reflects continued societal recognition of the importance
of both.
If the relationship between federal judicial power and local au-
thority is problematic in our union of states, it is all the more so in a
confederation of nations, such as the European Community.4 There,
the effort to interpret and apply the legal norms of a charter of rights
to which all constituent nations subscribe as a condition of community
membership must traverse even more profound barriers, including di-
verse languages, national histories, socio-economic structures, and
political and legal cultures.
It is no easy task to craft definitions of liberty of expression, a fair
trial, freedom of religious practice, or guaranteed social services. It is
even more difficult to judicially impose those standards on the govern-
ments of countries at different stages of economic and political devel-
opment, countries confronting heterogeneous problems of terrorism,
of the Fourteenth Amendment) and Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 752-89
(1997) (Souter, J., concurring) (surveying the Court's case law invoking the Fourteenth
Amendment to invalidate state action as violative of constitutionally protected rights or
liberty interests).
3. Compare Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (finding the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of Fourteenth Amendment provide no protection
against states' ban on physician-assisted suicide) with Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305
(1997) (finding that the Fourth Amendment precludes states from requiring drug testing of
candidates for certain state offices) but see id. at 328 (dissent argues that this case involves
a policy judgment best left to local legislatures "rather than being announced from on high
by the Federal Judiciary") and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state constitutional amendment barring legal protections
for homosexuals) but see id. at 636 (dissent accuses the majority of "imposing upon all
Americans" values of the "elite class from which the Members of this institution are
selected....").
4. As used in this article, the term "European Community" refers to the broad coali-
tion of nations that constitute the Council of Europe, which as of the end of 1996 had 40
member states. See J6rg Polakiewicz, The Application of the European Convention on
Human Rights in Domestic Law, 17 H.R.LJ. 405 n.3 (1996).
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ethnic conflict, crime, illegal immigration, and poverty. Yet, to have
meaning in Europe, the term "community" must signify that its citi-
zens enjoy some minimal legal guarantees and entitlements both while
they are at home and in other member nations.
The basic rights which the European Community attempts to en-
sure are contained in the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("Convention"), originally signed
by twelve states on November 4, 1950, in Rome.5 The European Con-
vention's prime interpreter is the European Court of Human Rights
("ECHR"), which sits in Strasbourg, France.6 This article examines a
particular instance where the Community, acting through the ECHR,
found a violation of the Convention by a contracting state, and ana-
lyzes the impact of that finding on the judicial system of the offending
nation. In this case, the member nation was Spain,7 in the case of
Barberd, Messegug and Jabardo v. Spain,8 and the rights violated were
those of a fair and public trial in general, and the right to confront
adverse witnesses in particular.
The Barberd matter merits substantial attention for several rea-
sons. First, during the years of its litigation, Spain was an emerging
democracy engaged in the process of building new political and legal
institutions after years of authoritarian rule. The Barberd case trav-
eled through Spain's newly constitutionalized criminal justice system
three times: once before the ECHR decision; then during the process
5. See J6rg Polakiewicz & Valerie Jacob-Foltzer, The European Rights Convention in
Domestic Law: The Impact of Strasbourg Case-Law in States Where Direct Effect is Given
to the Convention, 12 H.R.L.J. 65, 65 (1991) ("The Convention has proved to be a highly
successful treaty, which has gradually acquired the status of a 'constitutional instrument of
European public order in the field of human rights."'); Paul Mahoney, Judicial Activism
and Judicial Self-Restraint in the European Court of Human Rights: Two Sides of the Same
Coin, 11 H.R.L.J. 57, 71 (1990) ("It is... not illegitimate to attribute to the Contracting
Parties shared democratic values, or to see the Convention as establishing a legal commu-
nity with a common ethos in human-rights matters.").
6. See Mahoney, supra note 5, 11 H.R.L.J. at 59 ("By virtue of the Convention the
European Court of Human Rights is empowered to sit in final and binding judgment on
the democratic processes of the Contracting States."); Polakiewicz & Jacob-Foltzer, supra
note 5, at 65 ("[T]he Court has succeeded in asserting its role as the prime interpreter of
the Convention's provisions."); C.A. Gearty, The European Court of Human Rights and
the Protection of Civil Liberties: An Overview, 52 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 89, 89 (1993) ("It is not
improbable that the Court will emerge over time as a supreme court of Europe, at least so
far as human rights are concerned.").
7. See Polakiewicz & Jacob-Foltzer, supra note 5, at 132 ("Spain signed the European
Human Rights Convention on 24 November 1977, the date on which it became a member
of the Council of Europe. The Convention was ratified on 4 October 1979.").
8. BarberA, Messegu6 and Jabardo v. Spain, App. Nos. 10588/83-10590/83, 11 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 360 (1988) (Court report).
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which determined that Spain would accept and apply the ECHR find-
ing; and finally when the defendants in Barberd were granted the new
trial that the ECHR had mandated. The three journeys spanned more
than a decade, and provide a window into the changes wrought in the
Spanish criminal justice system over that period.
Second, hosts of newly independent nations in Eastern Europe
are now gaining admission into the economic, political, and legal insti-
tutions of their Western neighbors. 9 These states may also face an
ECHR directive to amplify their protection of fundamental liberties
while still attempting to establish their domestic legitimacy. Spain's
response to the judgment of the ECHR in the Barberd case may pro-
vide a model for the internal application of the Convention in other
nations.
Third, Spain is by tradition a civil law nation, while the right at
the core of the Barberd case-the right to confront adverse wit-
nesses-is historically associated with the adversarial process of the
common law tradition. The Barberd case addresses the extent to
which the Convention will move the criminal justice systems of mem-
ber nations-many of which have traditionally followed the inquisito-
rial model of criminal procedure-closer to the adversarial practices
of common law countries.
Finally, the Barberd case has its roots in one of the most difficult
problems facing modern society: political terrorism driven by ethnic
nationalism. In no other context can a signatory of the Convention
claim a greater interest in a flexible and robust police power than
when facing a violent indigenous political movement's particular
threat to life and property.10 Conversely, no rubric is more commonly
used by states to trample on the fundamental rights of their citizens,
particularly those of ethnic minorities, than that of the struggle against
terrorism. Indeed, the defendants in Barberd alleged that evidence
against them was extracted through the state's use of torture. Hard
questions make for important cases.
9. Hungary became the first former member of the Soviet bloc to sign the Conven-
tion on November 6, 1990. See Polakiewicz & Jacob-Foltzer, supra note 5, at 65. Many
others soon followed. See Polakiewicz, supra note 4, at 405 n.2; Jacques Robert, Constitu-
tional and International Protection of Human Rights: Competing or Complimentary Sys-
tems?, 15 H.R.L.J. 1, 12 (1994). The ECHR's "jurisdiction is coveted by the newly
emerging democracies in eastern and central Europe as a badge of legitimacy and a bul-
wark against future tyranny." Gearty, supra note 6, at 89.
10. Organized terrorism "constitutes a threat to the very existence of democracy; the
States must have at their disposal adequate weapons to counter organised [sic] terrorism,
otherwise the rights and freedoms safeguarded by the Convention risk becoming ineffec-
tive." Mahoney, supra note 5, at 68.
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H. Spain's Criminal Justice System: The
Constitutional Framework
Francisco Franco died in November of 1975, ending a forty year
dictatorial reign, and permitting the ascension of Juan Carlos de
Borbon as King. Contrary to Franco's plans, Juan Carlos did not sit
docilely as head of state while a rightist head of government continued
authoritarian rule. Rather, he handpicked as prime minister Adolfo
Suarez, who he knew would accommodate the powerful social and
political forces demanding freedom and democracy in Spain.
By the end of 1978, the Spanish people elected a constituent as-
sembly. This assembly, in turn, drafted and approved a new constitu-
tion. The Spanish people approved the constitution overwhelmingly
in a national referendum, and the King signed it into law.1' Spain's
transition from dictatorship to Western-style democracy became cer-
tain, however, only after the new constitutional regime had survived
both a 1981 coup attempt by right wing army officers12 and an electo-
ral transfer of power from a center-right government to the opposition
democratic socialists, who prevailed at the polls in November of
1982.13
The Spanish Constitution of 1978 is arguably as protective of civil
and human rights as that of any other nation.'4 It explicitly protects
11. See George E. Glos, The New Spanish Constitution, Comments and Full Text, 7
HASTjNGs CONST. L.Q. 47, 47-48 (1979).
The Constitution was approved by the Cortes on October 31, 1978, and by the
voters in a plebiscite on December 6, 1978. It was signed by the King on Decem-
ber 27, and became effective upon its publication in the official gazette, the Bole-
tin Oficial de Estado, on December 29, 1978. It is the tenth or thirteenth Spanish
Constitution in Spanish constitutional history, depending upon one's view of the
Napoleonic Constitution of Bayonne and two other constitutional projects.
Id. For discussions of the process of drafting and approving the 1978 Constitution, see
Mark D. Eibert, Note, The Spanish Constitutional Tribunal in Theory and Practice, 8 STAN.
J. IhT'L L. 435, 435-38 (1982); Henry W. McGee, Jr., Counsel For The Accused: Metamor-
phosis In Spanish Constitutional Rights, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 253, 255-57 (1987).
12. See McGee, supra note 11, at 259-60.
13. See JomN IHooPER, THE SPAN ,Rms 46 (1986). Hooper writes:
[I]f one is to put a date to the end of the transition then it must be 28 November
1982, because the fact that the armed forces were prepared to accept [the victory
of the Socialist Party] showed that it was possible for power to be transferred
from one party to another without bloodshed-and that ultimately, is the test of a
democracy.
Id. See also McGee, supra note 11, at 259 (citing articles for the proposition that "the
political transition came to an end with the Socialist victory in October of 1982").
14. See HOOPER, supra note 13, at 43. Hooper states:
The new Spanish Constitution is arguably the most liberal in Western Europe.
Spain is defined as a parliamentary monarchy, rather than just a constitutional
monarchy. There is no official religion and the armed forces are assigned a
winter 19991
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equality before the law;' 5 freedom from discrimination based on birth,
race, sex, religion, opinion, or personal condition;' 6 liberty of ideol-
ogy, religion, or cult;17 the right to freedom of expression by all me-
dia;18 the right to travel, 19 to associate,20 to peacefully assemble, 21 to
petition the government,22 to education,' to honor,24 and the right to
form trade unions.'
The 1978 Constitution also provides for the rights of an accused.
Article 17 guarantees that no person shall be deprived of their liberty
except as provided by law, and requires that an arrested party be
brought before a judge within 72 hours to be informed of his rights
and the charges against him.26 Article 24.2 grants a person accused of
a crime the following rights: to be informed of the accusation against
him, to a public trial without unnecessary delay, to present evidence in
his defense, to refuse to testify against himself or to incriminate him-
self, and to the presumption of innocence.2
A clear objective of this constitutionalization of procedural guar-
antees was to emphasize the accusatorial and adversarial aspects of
the criminal justice system over its inquisitorial features. Both tradi-
tions have deep historical roots in Spain. 8 Indeed, Spain had begun
strictly limited role. The death penalty is forbidden and the voting age fixed at
eighteen.
Id. The 1978 Constitution of "Spain goes to particular lengths in affirming individual
rights .... " Robert, supra note 9, at 10.
15. See C.E. art. 14 (1978).
16. See id.
17. See C.E. art. 16.1.
18. See C.E. art. 20.1.
19. See C.E. art. 19.
20. See C.E. art. 22.1.
21. See C.E. art. 21.1.
22. See C.E. art. 29.1.
23. See C.E. art. 27.1.
24. See C.E. art. 18.1.
25. See C.E. art. 28.1. For a clause by clause analysis of the 1978 Constitution, with
comparisons to related provisions of the constitutions of Germany, Italy, and the United
States, see Glos, supra note 11.
26. See C.E. art. 17.
27. Article 24.2 states:
Asimismo, todos tienen derecho al Juez ordinario predeterminado por la ley, a la
defensa y a la asistencia de letrado, a ser informados de la acusacion formulada
contra ellos, a un proceso publico sin dilaciones indebidas y con todas las garan-
tias, a utilizar los medios de prueba pertinentes para su defensa, a no declarar
contra si mismos, a no confesarse y la presuncion de inocencia.
C.E. art. 24.2.
28. See Ju~A-Luis GoMEz COLOMER, EL PROCESO PENAL ESPA OL (The Spanish
Penal System) 47 (1993). Gomez Colomer describes the historical characteristics of an
accusatorial system as: (1) the accuser was someone other than a judge; (2) the proceeding
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its movement from the canonically-rooted inquisitive tradition to-
wards an accusatorial criminal justice system long before the 1978
Constitution. The enactment of the 1882 Code of Criminal Procedure
(Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal, "LECRIM") 29 was a watershed in
the legislative evolution from the inquisitive system of the Antiguo
Rigimen (Ancient Regime) to a system "acusatorio formal y mixto."30
Under this mixed system, both prior to and since the 1978 Consti-
tution, the prosecution of serious crimes in Spain has had two phases:
the preparation of the written case summary by an instructing or in-
vestigative judge (el sumario) and the trial (el juicio oral), which is
held before a three judge tribunal or audiencia. Under Franco, this
process was secret, inquisitive, and summary; it nearly always resulted
in a finding of guilt.3 To change that focus, Article 120.2 of the Con-
stitution declares that the judicial process "shall be predominantly
oral, above all in criminal matters."32 The principle of oralidad means
had an oral phase; (3) the process was public; (4) there was an equality of resources be-
tween accuser and accused (igualidad de armas); (5) the power of the judge to gather evi-
dence was limited; (6) both accused and accuser had the right to offer evidence; and (7) the
accused remained free until convicted. See id. at 48-49. The characteristics of the inquisi-
torial system, spawned by the influence of the Canon Law, had as its characteristics (a) the
power of the judge to accuse; (b) the secrecy of the proceedings; (c) a totally written evi-
dentiary phase; (d) an identity between decision maker and accuser; (e) freedom of the
judge in the collection of evidence; (f) the lack of a right to present proof on the part of the
accused; and (g) pre-judgment detention. See id. at 49-50.
29. L.E. CRIM (1882).
30. Gormz COLOMER, supra note 28, at 50. Furthermore, a jury system, perhaps the
quintessential feature of the Anglo-Saxon adversarial and accusatorial regime, was intro-
duced in Spain around the same time as the 1882 LECRIM, only to have its fate rise or fall
with that of subsequent democratic regimes. The jury system was suspended in 1923, re-
vived in April of 1931 by the Second Republic, and suspended with the outbreak of the
Civil War in 1936. See id. at 52. Needless to say, it remained a dead letter during Franco's
years in power. The jury function is provided for in the 1978 Constitution. See C.E. art.
127. Since the Constitution's passage, the jury's reemergence has been prepared, albeit
slowly, and a pilot project has been implemented.
31. Writing in 1964, an American law professor observed that:
[i]n Spain most of the procedural steps occur in advance of the trial (juicio oral).
In effect there are two trials if one uses the word "trial" in a somewhat loose
fashion. The first "trial" is a quasi-inquisitorial procedure known as the sumario,
a summary or resume of the facts and the law prepared by a judge of instruction
who is in charge of the investigation.... The juicio oral may be, and usually is, a
somewhat brief affair because the interrogation of witnesses, examination of the
facts, etc., have occurred in the sumario, and the witnesses at the trial merely
confirm or deny what they have previously stated during the course of the
sumario.
David E. Murray, A Survey Of Criminal Procedure In Spain And Some Comparisons With
Criminal Procedure In The United States, 40 N.D. L. REv. 7, 8 (1964).
32. Article 120.2 states: "El procedimiento serd predominantemente oral, sobre todo
en materia criminal." (The procedure shall be predominantly oral, especially in criminal
matters.) C.E. art. 120.2.
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that the judge or tribunal sitting in judgment must convict or acquit on
the basis of the evidence taken and the facts established at the juicio
oral, rather than upon material gathered by the judge of instruction
during the investigative or sumarial process.33
The practice of oralidad has a multi-faceted, anti-inquisitorial im-
pact. Since under the Constitution the juicio oral must be public, 34 the
process of determining guilt or innocence is open, unlike the sumarial
process, which can be conducted secretly.35 Likewise, under oralidad
the accused is present, represented by counsel, and is entitled to. offer
evidence, since the Constitution guarantees these rights at the oral
hearing.36
Requiring that a criminal judgment rest on the evidence adduced
at the juicio oral has an additional critical consequence: it gives de-
fendants the right to confront and cross examine witnesses. 7 While
the Spanish Constitution's procedural guarantees are fulsome, they do
not offer the right afforded by the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Con-
stitution38 and, as will be discussed below, by the European Conven-
tion:39 the right to examine adverse witnesses. Under Article 708 of
the LECRIM, however, all parties are entitled to ask questions of wit-
nesses who appear at the juicio oral.4" Though the right to examina-
tion predated the Constitution's principle of oralidid,41 given the
33. See GoMEz COLOMER, supra note 28, at 52, 72-73.
34. See C.E. arts. 24.2 & 120.1.
35. See GoMEz COLOMER, supra note 28, at 73.
36. Spanish law also now provides, with certain limitations, a right to counsel following
arrest. See McGee, supra note 11.
37. See GoMEz COLOMER, supra note 28, at 261-62 ("[Tjhe evidentiary process regu-
lated by our LECRIM permits the utilization of the system of cross-examination character-
istic of Anglo-Saxon law .... ").
38. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673,678 (1986) ("The Confrontation Clause
of the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution 'to be
confronted with the witnesses against him."'). See also Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Con-
stitutionalization of Hearsay: The Extent to Which the Fifth and Sixth Amendments Permit
or Require the Liberalization of the Hearsay Rules, 76 MMN. L. REv. 521 (1992). Im-
winkelried states:
[TIhe right to cross-examination is the primary interest secured by the Confronta-
tion Clause... The central purpose of cross-examination is to augment the accu-
racy of the factfinding process. Cross-examination allows the questioner to probe
for latent deficiencies in the witness's perception, memory, narrative ability, and
sincerity. Cross-examination advances a practical concern for testimonial
accuracy.
Id. at 525.
39. Article 6 (3)(e) of the European Convention grants a defendant the right "to ex-
amine or have examined witnesses against him... " Eur. Cony. on H.R. art. (6)(3)(e).
40. See L.E. CRn. art. 708.
41. See Murray, supra note 31, at 14.
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determinative role of the sumario under Franco, the right to confront
witnesses came too late in the game to mean much.4 2
Finally, the Constitution of 1978 eliminates the Francoist practice
of entirely bypassing the normal judicial system in favor of military
tribunals or courts of exception. In the decade prior to Franco's
death, the chief engine of political repression was a special judicial
tribunal called the Tribunal de Orden Publico ("T.O.P."), which con-
ducted 1000 secret proceedings between 1963 and 1973, most involv-
ing multiple defendants.4 3 When, in 1970 and 1971, Spanish lawyers
refused to represent defendants before the T.O.P. on the grounds that
it was nothing more than an instrument of political repression, the
T.O.P. tried and sentenced the defendants without counsel, and then
indicted and tried the lawyers who had refused to defend them." To-
day, those accused of crimes have the constitutional right to be tried in
the judicial system by a judge selected in accordance with the law,
rather than by specially appointed judge or tribunal.45
111. Spain's Constitutional Tribunal
One of the United States' most significant contributions to the
modem conception of a democratic society is the right to judicial re-
view of the constitutionality of executive and legislative action.46
Since World War II, newly declared democracies have increasingly
perceived such review to be a necessary part of their emerging struc-
tures of government.47 To guarantee protection of the rights it cre-
42. As Murray noted in 1964: "Since the sumario contains all of the statements
(declaraciones) of those persons who will testify at the trial and since their statements usu-
ally were taken outside of the presence of the procesado [accused], he has been denied any
right of cross-examination." Id. at 13.
43. See Josd J. Toharia, Judicial Independence in an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of
Contemporary Spain, 9 L. & Soc'y. RFv. 475, 479, 492-95 (1975).
44. See id. at 494.
45. See C.E. art. 24.2 ("todos tienen derecho al Juez ordinario predeterminado por la
ley. . .") (all have a right to an ordinary judge selected according to law); C.E. art. 117.6
("Se prohiben los tribunales de excepcfon.") (Courts of exception are forbidden.).
46. See MAURO CAPELLErI & WILLIAM COHEN, COMPARAInV CONSITrLIONAL
LAW 12 (1979) (cited in McGee, supra note 11, at 289 n.147) ("One of the essential legal
developments of our time is, for a growing number of civil law countries, the introduction
of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation. Although this institution has an-
cient historical precedents, the matrix of its modem growth may certainly be seen, in part,
in the American model."). See also Robert, supra note 9, at 4 ("[T]wentieth-century Eu-
rope, belatedly acting on the American example, has made provision for review of acts of
the public authorities in terms of constitutionality .... ").
47. See CAPELLE=r & COHEN, supra note 46. The authors state that:
Judicial review of legislation, a rarely encountered institution until recent times,
has been introduced in the last few decades in various countries throughout the
world. Since the last World War, the growth of this institution has experienced
Winter 19991
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ated, the Constitution of 1978 established in Spain a Constitutional
Tribunal along the lines of the model previously adopted by Italy and
West Germany.4" To some extent, this step also followed the prece-
dents of Spain's own pre-Franco republican phase.49
Consistent with those models, the Constitutional Tribunal is not
part of the judicial system,50 nor are its members drawn principally
from the ranks of the judicial profession.51 Reflecting civil law coun-
tries' traditional distrust of the judiciary, the drafters of the Constitu-
tion designed a tribunal that would sit astride the branches of
government, with the ultimate power to decide if their actions were
compatible with the provisions of the Constitution.
52
Eschewing the American case or controversy requirement,53 the
Spanish Constitution encourages direct challenges to the constitution-
what could well be called a worldwide explosion. It almost appears as if no West-
ern, or even Eastern, country purporting to be a modem democracy, can resist
the temptation to adopt some form of control-judicial or otherwise-of the con-
stitutionality of legislation.
Id at 15.
48. See Eibert, supra note 11, at 435 ("One of the most important of Spain's new
democratic institutions is the Constitutional Tribunal, whose function is to ensure that laws
and governmental actions conform with the new Constitution, including the individual
rights and liberties which the Constitution guarantees."). The Constitutional Tribunal "was
deliberately modeled after three historical examples: the Tribunal of Constitutional Guar-
antees of the Second Spanish Republic and the post-World War II constitutional adjudicat-
ing bodies of Italy and Germany." Id. at 438 n.14. See also Glos, supra note 11, at 75
("The new Spanish Constitutional Court is similar to its predecessor under the Spanish
Constitution of 1931 and to that of Italy.").
49. See id.
50. See Sentencias del Tribunal Constitucional (Constitutional Judgment Tribunal)
Sept. 1981 ("The Constitutional Tribunal does not form part of the Judicial Power and is at
the margin of the organization of the Courts of Justice.").
51. See C.E. art. 159.2 ("The members of the Constitutional Tribunal shall be nomi-
nated from Magistrates and Prosecutors, Professors of the University, public officials and
lawyers, all jurists of recognized competence with more than fifteen years of practice.").
52. See Eibert, supra note 11. Eibert states that:
Spain is a civil law country. Like the judiciary in other civil-law nations, the Span-
ish judiciary is a career service which has neither substantial power nor social
prestige, and is generally distrusted. The drafters of the 1978 Constitution conse-
quently opted for a concentrated system of constitutional adjudication, with ex-
clusive jurisdiction to decide constitutional questions vested in a small politically
appointed body composed primarily of law professors with no prior judicial
experience.
Id. at 435-36. See also McGee, supra note 11, at 291-92.
53. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997), citing Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976). ("No principle is more fundamental to the judiciary's
proper role in our system of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court
jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies."). Raines found a group of Congressman su-
ing to challenge the constitutionality of the recently enacted Line Item Veto Act lacked the
standing needed to create a case or controversy. See id.
ality of legislation. Indeed, such challenges may be brought immedi-
ately upon the enactment of a particular law by means of el recurso de
inconstitutionalidad (claim of constitutional violation).54 Citizens may
also challenge the facial validity of a statute during the litigation of an
action in the judicial system. In such a case a judge is to refer the
question de inconstitucionalidad to the Constitutional Tribunal if he or
she considers that the particular law in question "may be" unconstitu-
tional.55 In so delineating the Tribunal's power "[w]ith far greater
precision and clarity than the U.S. Constitution, the Spanish Constitu-
tion made the Constitutional Tribunal supreme."56
In addition, and of particular significance to the Barberd case, the
Tribunal has the power to hear recursos or demandas de amparo (peti-
tions for protection). These are suits alleging violations of the funda-
mental rights and liberties enumerated in Articles 14 through 29 and
30.2 of the Constitution." When the Tribunal grants relief in such a
case, "it may do whatever is necessary to nullify or suspend govern-
mental acts and to restore the rights of the injured party . ... 5
Under the law which governs the operation of the Tribunal, "the ap-
plicant [for amparo] must exhaust all possible remedies before asking
the Tribunal for protection. In the case of challenged judicial acts,
exhaustion of remedies means the exhaustion of appeals."59
54. See C.E. art. 161.1(a) & 162(a). For example, article 162(a) specifically authorizes
groups of legislators to challenge legislation through recursos de inconstitucionalidad in the
manner deemed impermissible in Raines.
55. See C.E art. 163; Eibert, supra note 11, at 443-45. See also Glos, supra note 11, at
75 ("In contrast to American judicial practice, a Spanish court cannot declare a statute
unconstitutional, but must submit such matters to the Constitutional Court; the latter has
the exclusive jurisdiction to make declarations of unconstitutionality. In this respect, the
Spanish practice comports with that in [other] European countries."); Robert, supra note 9,
at 4 ("The procedure for reference by the courts first appeared in Austria and later in
Germany before being developed in Italy. It has now been taken over by Spain, Portugal,
Belgium, and others.").
56. McGee, supra note 11, at 291.
57. See C.E. art. 161(1)(b). See also Eibert, supra note 11, at 448-49 ("A party can use
an amparo to challenge almost any governmental act that is not a law, whether it be an
administrative act, a judicial act or decision, or even a legislative act without the force of
law."). Glos writes:
The highlight of the new constitution's Title IX is its provision on amparo. The
amparo, a citizen's action contesting the validity of any law or official disposition
adversely affecting constitutionally guaranteed civil rights, is first alluded to in a
Spanish constitutional context in the Constitution of 1931. Under that document,
the amparo might have been brought before the Court of Constitutional Guaran-
tees when recourse to other authorities failed to provide redress.
Glos, supra note 11, at 75-76.
58. Eibert, supra note 11, at 449.
59. Id. (quoting the Ley Organico de Tribunal Constitucional ("L.O.T.C.")). As with
all laws relating to the development of fundamental rights and liberties, the statute gov-
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The demanda de amparo is thus similar to a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus brought in a United States federal court by a state pris-
oner seeking review of his state court conviction. Federal habeas
corpus jurisdiction that emerged in the wake of the Civil War was
forged from the concern that state courts would not adequately pro-
tect the newly minted rights under the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments. 60 The same type of concern led the drafters
of the 1978 Constitution to provide those whose claims of fundamen-
tal rights violations were rejected by the judicial branch with recourse
to the Constitutional Tribunal. In this country, the controlling federal
statute limits habeas review to claims that a conviction violated the
prisoner's federal constitutional rights. Plaintiffs can bring such claims
to the federal courts only if they have been rejected by the highest
court of the state in question. 61 There are procedural requirements
analogous to those imposed on the Constitutional Tribunal's amparo
jurisdiction. Of great importance to the present discussion, Article
10.2 of the Spanish Constitution states that the Constitutional Tribu-
nal and the Cortes must interpret provisions recognizing fundamental
liberties and freedoms in conformity with "international treaties and
accords concerning these matters ratified by Spain."'6 2 Furthermore,
Article 96.1 of the Constitution states that international treaties, once
formally ratified and published, shall form part of the internal law of
Spain.63
IV. The Case of Barberi Messegu and Jabardo
A. Round One: The Case in Spain
On May 9, 1977, at the halfway point in the tumultuous period
between the death of Franco and the ratification of Spain's democratic
Constitution, an armed group invaded a private home in Barcelona
and accosted a 77 year old Catalan businessman, Jose Maria Bult6
erning the operation of the Constitutional Tribunal is an "organic law." An organic law is
different from an ordinary law in that it "can be passed, repealed, or amended only by an
absolute majority of both Houses of the Cortes rather than by a simple majority of those
voting." Id. at 436 (quoting C.E. art. 81). "The importance attached to the Tribunal is
indicated by the fact that it was the subject of the first organic law passed by the Cortes
after the adoption of the Constitution." Id. at 438.
60. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401 n.9 (1963) ("The Act of February 5, 1867...
which extended federal habeas corpus to state prisoners generally, was passed in anticipa-
tion of possible Southern recalcitrance toward Reconstruction legislation.").
61. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1998).
62. C.E. art. 10.2.
63. See Polakiewicz & Jacob-Foltzer, supra note 5, at 133.
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Marquis.64 The interlopers demanded payment of a multi-million
dollar ransom within twenty five days.65 Then, they fixed an explosive
device on Bult6's chest, telling him he would receive instructions on
how to remove it only when the money was paid.6 6 Two hours later,
the bomb exploded, apparently unintentionally, killing Bult6
instantly.67
Investigators quickly focused on Catalan Peoples' Army
("E.PO.CA."), a nationalist group seeking a separate Catalan state
through armed struggle.68 In July of 1977, four members of the
group-one of whom was recognized by witnesses at the scene of the
break-in-were arrested.6 9 That November, however, they were re-
leased by court order under a new amnesty law.70 In early 1978, that
decision was reversed by the Spanish Supreme Court, and proceedings
were reinstated.71 By that time, of course, the four had disappeared.
In March of 1979, further investigation of the Bult6 case led the
police to arrest J. Martinez Vendrell and hold him incommunicado
under anti-terrorist laws then in effect.72 After a week in custody
without access to counsel, Vendrell gave a statement describing him-
self as a leader of an armed group seeking Catalan independence, and
stating that he had recruited and trained both Messegu6 and Barberh
and integrated them into underground cells of his operation.73 Ven-
drell further stated that he had been told that these two had devel-
oped an explosive device that could be attached to a person's body for
the purposes of extortion, and that Messegu6 had in fact shown him
the device.7 4 In this same declaration at the police station, Vendrell
stated that he was told in April of 1977 that the two had chosen Bult6
as their first victim.75 According to Vendrell's initial statement, he
was informed after the botched operation that eleven people had par-
ticipated, and that Barber and Messegu6 had attached the device to
the victim's chest.76
64. See Barbert, Messegu6 and Jabardo v. Spain, App. Nos. 10588/83-10590/83, 11
Eur. H.R. Rep. 360, 362 (1988) (Court report).
65. See id.
66. See id.







74. See id. at 364.
75. See id.
76. See id.
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When Vendrell finally appeared before a magistrate, however, his
story had changed. Although he confirmed the general description of
his, Barber and Messegu6's roles in revolutionary activities, he re-
tracted his prior statements regarding Barberh and Messegu6's roles
in Bult6's homicide.77 Specifically, he stated that though these two
might have made the bomb, he did not know the names of those who
carried out the attack. 8 The state nevertheless charged Vendrell, Bar-
berA, and Messegu6 with murder-although BarberA and Messegu6
were not located at the time.7 9 During Vendrell's subsequent prosecu-
tion, he once again maintained that he could not identify Barberh and
Messegu6 as participants in the Bult6 homicide.8" In June of 1980, the
court absolved Vendrell of murder charges; however, it convicted him
of a lesser offense following his juicio oral before the Audiencia Na-
cional81 As the court sentenced Vendrell to time he had already
served, he was released, and quickly disappeared.82 He was unavaila-
ble during subsequent proceedings.83
1. The Audiencia Nacional
Police finally arrested BarberA, Messegu6, and Jabardo on Octo-
ber 14, 1980.84 Their homes contained radio transmitters and receiv-
ers and political literature.8 5 Under anti-terrorism legislation, these
three arrestees were also held incommunicado without access to coun-
sel, during which time they signed statements admitting involvement
in the Bult6 murder.86 They also led the police to stockpiles of arms
and explosives.87 Notably, their accounts differed from that of Ven-







83. On an appeal taken by Bult6's son-Spanish law allows the participation in crimi-
nal cases of interested private parties-the Spanish Supreme Court found Vendrell guilty
of a more serious offense than had the Audiencia Nacional (aiding and abetting a murder
rather than assisting armed gangs) and dramatically increased his sentence. See id- at 365.
Nevertheless, he was never located to serve the harsher term. See il. According to a 1993
judgment of the Audiencia Nacional, Vendrell died in November of 1989, while still at
liberty. See Audiencia Nacional, Sentencia No. 44/93, at 3 (on file with Hastings Constitu-
tional Law Quarterly).
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later, they all retracted their confessions. Moreover, Jabardo and
Messegu6 complained of being subjected to physical and psychologi-
cal torture while in custody. 89
During their subsequent prosecution, the three defendants main-
tained their innocence and continued to assert that their initial state-
ments had been the result of torture.9 At no time during the pretrial
process were the defendants confronted with any of the prosecution
witnesses, most particularly Vendrell, who was no longer in custody.91
The addition of new material to that gathered earlier in the Bult6 case
produced a 1600 page sumario or case file.
In December of 1981, the Court denied a motion to hold the trial
in Barcelona, where the defendants were confined. 92 On January 12,
1982, authorities transported the defendants in a police van overnight
from Barcelona to Madrid for what would be a one day trial.93 The
trial was conducted by a senior judge of the division in a high security
courtroom, with the defendants handcuffed in a glass cage.94 At the
defendants' trial, the entire investigative file was received in evidence
by agreement por reproducida (without formally being read out in
court).95 The fie included the statements which defendants and Ven-
drell alleged were coerced and taken in the absence of counsel.96 The
ifie also contained the less damaging, but nonetheless incriminating,
statement made by Vendrell after conferring with counsel.97 As noted
above, Vendrell absconded after his trial and was not available to
testify.
The physical evidence and statements which the defendants did
not challenge linked them to revolutionary activities and arms stock-
piles, but not directly to the murder. Mr. Bult6's brother in law-the
only witness who testified at trial for the prosecution-was unable to
identify the defendants.98 The defense called ten witnesses, several to
prove their good character, and several to prove that they had been
brutalized while in custody before making the confessions they later
retracted. 99 The defendants themselves denied any participation in
89. See id.
90. See id. at 366.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 367.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 368.
96. See id. at 367.
97. See i
98. See id. at 368.
99. See id.
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the murder and again complained of having been tortured."° Addi-
tionally, they claimed that the crime charged was subject to an Octo-
ber 1977 amnesty covering politically motivated offenses.' 0
Three days later, on January 15, 1982, the Audiencia Nacional
found two of the three defendants, BarberA and Messegu6, guilty of
murder and sentenced them to thirty years in prison. According to
the court, the state had proved that BarberA and Messegu6 fixed the
bomb to Bult6's chest and demanded the ransom. 10 2 The court con-
victed Jabardo on a lesser charge of aiding and abetting in the murder
and sentenced him to twelve years imprisonment. 03 It concluded that
Jabardo had assisted the extortion attempt by gathering information
about public figures-including Bult6-in Catalonia °4
Though the Audiencia did not disclose the evidence it relied
upon, the state's oral testimony at the juicio oral was certainly insuffi-
cient to justify a finding that BarberA and Messegu6 were personally
involved in placing the bomb. Indeed, the lone prosecution witness,
Bult6's brother, did not connect any of the three to the crime. As the
defendants' counsel argued to the Audiencia, the fact that the defend-
ants knew of the location of weapons did not implicate them in
Bult6's homicide.
Thus, the convictions can be explained in one of two ways. The
first posits that the Audiencia Nacional convicted Barbera and Mes-
segu6 on the basis of their confessions. This view raises the possibility,
or even likelihood, that their convictions resulted from the most re-
pugnant feature of the inquisitive tradition-the use of torture. 0 5 In-
deed, at the time of the defendants' arrest, police violence against






105. Gomez Colomer notes that, in its heyday, the inquisitive system "authorized the
practice of torture to obtain a confession, the crowning proof in this procedural process."
GompZ COLOMER, supra note 28, at 49.
106. According to Amnesty International investigations in 1975 and 1979,
the torture and ill-treatment of detainees is 'persistent'. Most of the complaints
are lodged by people detained under the anti-terrorist legislation, which was first
introduced as an 'emergency' measure in 1977 and which allows the police to hold
anyone suspected of a wide range of offenses for up to ten days.
HooPER, supra note 13, at 124-25. These investigations were followed by a study con-
ducted by the Spanish Human Rights Association in 1982 which "found that torture by
both the Civil Guard and local police persisted. The organization regarded as indispensable
the abolition of legal rules that authorized detention for ten days prior to a judicial hear-
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ercion could be refuted-and the Audiencia made no finding to that
effect-reliance on the confessions would taint the convictions.
Under the second view, the Audiencia may have relied on Ven-
drell's statements which were the only other evidence that tied the
defendants to the murder. The first and most incriminating statement
was taken while Vendrell was held incommunicado without access to
counsel and, according to his later allegations, subjected to torture.
Apart from the issue of coercion, Vendrell did not appear at the juicio
oral, nor was he available to be examined by the defendants following
their arrest. Reliance on any of Vendrell's case file statements would
again constitute an inquisitive practice offensive to the principle of
oralidad enshrined in Article 120.2 of the Constitution. °7 Thus, as it
entered the appellate process, the Barberd case seemed an appropri-
ate vehicle to confirm the importance of the right to confrontation of
witnesses under Spanish law.
2. The Spanish Supreme Court
Following their convictions, the defendants appealed to the Span-
ish Supreme Court. They complained that their statements, and those
of Vendrell, were both coerced and illegally obtained without the
assistance of counsel."°8 The defendants asserted that absent the
tainted material, "there was no evidence to rebut the presumption
that they were innocent of Mr. Bult6's murder.. , o9 They further
noted that the Audiencia had failed to address their claim of coercion,
and had not indicated the extent to which it had relied on the chal-
lenged evidence."' The defendants maintained, with good reason,
that the only way to explain the Audiencia's verdict was through its
reliance on the coerced statements.'
As discussed above, the defendants' claims could not be easily
dismissed; in fact, in its judgment of December 27, 1982, the Spanish
ing." McGee, supra note 11, at 261. It was, of course, under the aforementioned anti-
terrorist legislation that the defendants and Martinez Vendrell had been held incommuni-
cado and interrogated.
107. At the time of the defendants' trial in 1982, observation of the principle of oralidad
appears to have been the exception rather than the rule. As Hooper observed in 1985,
"[u]nder Spanish law, the trial is divided into two phases-a written stage and an oral
stage. The Constitution states unequivocally that 'the procedure shall be predominantly
oral'. But despite this the majority of cases are still dealt with mainly on paper." HOOPER,
supra note 13, at 125.
108. See Barberd, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 368-69.
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Supreme Court ordered an inquiry into the allegations of ill treat-
ment.112 The defendants, however, could not raise that claim directly
on appeal. The Spanish judicial system was then still ill-equipped to
deal with the system of rights contemplated by the 1978 Constitution:
a criminal defendant in 1982 did not possess a statutorily recognized
right to challenge his conviction on appeal due to a violation of his
fundamental rights during his juicio oral. The legislative reform au-
thorizing such a basis for an appeal to the Supreme Court in serious
cases (el recurso de casaci6n) did not come until 1985."1 Criminal
appeals within the Spanish judicial system (as opposed to recursos de
amparo to the Constitutional Tribunal) at the time of the first Barberd
appeal were largely limited to challenges to the trial court's classifica-
tion of the established facts as a crime of one degree rather than
another.
An existing exception to the bar to raising claims of a deprivation
of a fundamental right on appeal was that of violations of the pre-
sumption of innocence. As the ECHR would later note in its judg-
ment in the Barberd case:
In view of the Constitutional Court's case law in this area, the
Supreme Court has extended the scope of proceedings in ap-
peals on points of law. It has held that the presumption of inno-
cence can be relied upon before it in respect of an infringement
of the law resulting from an error made by the trial court when
assessing the evidence ... , or on some other ground.
According to a judgment of 3 November 1982, the Supreme
Court's review of the evidence is directed only to the question
whether evidence was produced and taken and not to the crimi-
nal court's final assessment of that evidence.
1 4
112. See id. at 370.
113. See Polakiewicz & Jacob-Foltzer, supra note 5, at 133 ("The Institutional Act (Ley
Organica) on Judicial Authorities (6/1985, of 1 July 1985) improved the system for the
protection of fundamental rights by making the violation of a constitutional right a ground
of appeal in cassation, (Article 5), thus enabling judicial decisions to be set aside if they
breach the principle governing hearings, assistance and defense, provided that the con-
victed person was improperly deprived of means of defense (Articles 238-243)"). See also
GoMEz COLOMER, supra note 28, at 286-90.
114. Barberd, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 374. The ECHR further noted that:
[a]n ordinary appeal does not lie against judgments of the Audencia Nacional;
only the special remedy of an appeal on points of law or procedure is available.
By Article 849, the law is deemed to have been violated... (2) where an error of
facts has been made in assessing the evidence and this appears from authentic
documents not contradicted by other evidence. It has been held by the Supreme
Court that in the second of these two eventualities the principle of the presump-
tion of innocence can be prayed in aid.
Id. at 376.
The defendants thus argued to the Supreme Court that the Con-
stitution could not support conviction absent valid proof in the record
sufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence. In addressing
that claim, the Supreme Court would have to come to terms with
then-recently issued jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal con-
cerning the probative value, or lack thereof, of statements from de-
clarants who lacked counsel.11 In a July 28, 1981 judgment, Division
One (Sala Primera) of the Tribunal had granted a recurso de amparo
voiding a robbery conviction, holding that a confession taken without
the presence of counsel could not overcome the presumption of inno-
cence. It stated that:
Presumed innocent, the defendant could not be imprisoned or
fined without evidence that he had committed a crime. For an
item of proof to be considered evidence, the Court reasoned, it
would have to be tested judicially. Police testimony concerning
statements alleged to have been made by the defendant had the
value of an accusation only. In order to be admissible, such a
confession would have to be reiterated in court, at which time
counsel would be present. In short, the statement would have to
be received with the protections afforded by formal
proceedings." 6
Notably, the Tribunal had applied this doctrine to invalidate the
convictions of three alleged Basque terrorists in December 1982, just
prior to the Supreme Court's decision in the Barberd case. At the
juicio oral, the prosecution offered the Basque defendants' statements
made at the police station (which were ultimately repudiated when
the defendants claimed that the confessions were obtained by torture)
as proof of their guilt." 7 The Tribunal again held that declarations
made without the assistance of counsel, as provided in Article 17 of
the Constitution, "did not have the character of proof;" therefore,
there was insufficient evidence to overcome the presumption of inno-
cence to which the defendants were constitutionally entitled."1
8
115. The Constitutional Tribunal began issuing decisions on January 6, 1981. See
Eibert, supra note 11, at 457. Although the civil law tradition abhorred the concept of
judges creating law through precedent, the Spanish Constitution and the L.O.T.C. specifi-
cally provide for it. "[A]lithough cases that are res judicata generally cannot be reopened,
the jurisprudencia derived from such cases is overruled if it conflicts with a judgment of the
Constitutional Tribunal. The resulting supremacy of Constitutional Tribunal decisions
should therefore theoretically prevent any conflicts of interpretation with the Supreme
Court." Id. at 444 (quoting C.E. art. 161(1)(a) and L.O.T.C. art. 40.2). See also GoMFz
COLONMER, supra note 28, at 74.
116. McGee, supra note 11, at 295.
117. See id at 292-93.
118. See id.
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By the time the Barberd case reached the Supreme Court, the
Government conceded that statements taken in the absence of coun-
sel were not admissible evidence. The defendants in Barberd in turn
asserted that without the tainted statements, there was insufficient
proof to overcome their right under Article 24.2 to the presumption of
innocence.119 The Supreme Court responded by attempting to fashion
a statement of the facts which neither referred to the defendants' chal-
lenged confessions nor to Vendrell's first and most damaging
statement. 2 o
The Supreme Court thus relied on the statements the defendants
made with the assistance of counsel, in which they admitted revolu-
tionary activity, but denied involvement in the charged murder. 21
The Court also considered Vendrell's second statement which dis-
cussed the defendants' revolutionary training, opined that they could
have made the Bult6 bomb, but denied knowledge of the perpetra-
tors' identity. 22 Rejecting the claim that the judgements violated the
presumption of innocence, the Supreme Court affirmed the convic-
tions of Barbera and Messegu6: "The mere existence of this evidence,
irrespective of its implications and the way in which it is assessed, in
[sic] sufficient to rebut the presumption of innocence relied on by the
defendants Barber Chamorro and Messegu6 Mas .... ." The Court
did overturn Jabardo's conviction for aiding and abetting murder,
holding that the established facts amounted to the lesser offense of
assisting armed gangs. Jabardo's sentence was thus reduced from
twelve to six years.' 24
The Supreme Court's treatment of the defendants' fundamental
procedural rights suffers from three glaring deficiencies. First, in spite
of its ruling, the Court relied on Vendrell's allegedly coerced state-
ment. While the Court did not directly refer to that statement, it did
rely on findings of fact contained in the June 17, 1980 Audiencia Na-
cional judgment convicting Vendrell in the Bult6 case.' 5 Those find-
ings of fact were obviously based on Vendrell's initial statement that
the defendants told him they had chosen Bult6 as the first person on
whom to use a bomb. The Court thus, at least indirectly, relied on
119. See Barberd, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 369.
120. See id. at 370-71.
121. See id. at 371.
122. See id. at 370.
123. Id. at 371.
124. See iU.
125. See id. at 370.
THE RIGHTS TO A FAIR TRIAL
evidence that was patently inadmissible under the Constitutional Tri-
bunal's jurisprudence.
Second, even had the Supreme Court avoided reliance on the co-
erced confessions, a finding of other evidence of guilt could not re-
solve the defendants' challenge to the statements' use at trial. When
facing a claim of coercion, an appellate court must examine whether
interrogators employed physical duress, and if so, whether the trier of
fact relied on the evidence in reaching a conviction. If the trier did
rely on coerced evidence, the court must vacate the convictions be-
cause they rest, at least in part, on a human rights violation, and thus,
are tainted by it.
That analysis must be more searching in an adversarial system
than one in which the weighing of oral testimony is not critical to the
decision of guilt or innocence. In a process that relies heavily on the
sumario, an appellate court is in just as good a position as the trial
court in deciding whether a defendant is guilty; and if so, to determine
the precise nature of the crime.'26 Accordingly, a trial court's reliance
on improper documentary evidence has a simple remedy: the appel-
late court excises the offensive document from the record and decides
the case on the remaining proof.
Such an approach is problematic, however, if a criminal defend-
ant is guaranteed a process in which a trier of fact determines his guilt
or innocence at a public hearing where the defendant has a right to
present evidence and confront the proof against him with the assist-
ance of counsel. At the hearing conducted in conformance with either
the common law tradition or the principle of oralidad, the trier of fact
must determine the credibility of testimony based on the demeanor of
witnesses. In such a system, an appeals court cannot readily remedy
an error which skews the trier of fact's findings.'27
126. This civil law tradition is exemplified by the fact that the Spanish Supreme Court
readily felt entitled in the case of Vendrell to convict him on appeal of a more serious
offense than had the Audiencia Nacional, and in the case of Jabardo, to acquit of the of-
fense found by the Audiencia Nacional, returning a less severe verdict.
127. This is particularly true in a system where there exists "the historical and constitu-
tionally guaranteed right of criminal defendants to demand that the jury decide guilt or
innocence on every issue .... ." United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 513 (1995). If an
appellate court adds or subtracts evidence to the trial record to remedy an error made in
the admission of evidence below and then reweighs the evidence to decide whether it is
now adequate to prove guilt or innocence, it is the appellate court which serves as the real
decision maker in the case, rather than lay jurors from whom a defendant is constitution-
ally entitled to a verdict. When a reviewing court speculates as to what a jury may have
done, "the wrong entity judge[s] the defendant guilty." Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275,
281 (1993) (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578 (1986)).
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This point is most crucial in cases involving an improperly admit-
ted confession. The existence of other evidence sufficient to convict
can rarely, if ever, save a judgment resting on a record containing a
coerced confession. Given the powerful impact of a confession on any
trier of fact, the state can rarely establish that in its absence the trier
of fact would have found that remaining evidence sufficient to estab-
lish guilt.128 Certainly there was every reason to believe that the
Audiencia Nacional relied on the entire record before it, including the
incommunicado statements which constituted the only unequivocal
evidence of the defendants' guilt. Yet, under the then extant statutes
governing the content of criminal appeals, the Supreme Court held
that the voluntariness of the challenged statements and their impact
on the Audiencia Nacional did not present cognizable legal issues.
129
Third, the Supreme Court opinion created, rather than resolved,
a conceptually separate issue of a fundamental rights violation. The
Court relied heavily on Vendrell's statement to a magistrate following
his initial, incommunicado interrogation. VendrelU, however, neither
testified at the trial of BarberA, Messegu6, and Jabardo, nor was he
made available for questioning by defense counsel at any time follow-
ing the arrest of their clients. 30 Reliance on this statement was con-
sistent with an inquisitive procedure, rather than the principle of
oralidad or any right to confront adverse witnesses. Like the decision
of the Audiencia Nacional, the Supreme Court's opinion in December
of 1982 failed to come to grips with the essential changes wrought by
the constitutionalization of Spain's criminal justice system.
128. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 296 (1991). The case stated that:
A confession is like no other evidence. Indeed, "the defendant's own confession
is probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted
against him.... [T]he admissions of a defendant come from the actor himself, the
most knowledgeable and unimpeachable source of information about his past
conduct. Certainly, confessions have a profound impact on the jury, so much so
that we may justifiably doubt its ability to put them out of mind even if told to do
so.,
Id (quoting Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 139-40 (1968) (White, J., dissenting)).
129. See BarberA, Messegu6 and Jabardo v. Spain, App. Nos. 10588/83-10590/83, 11
Eur. H.R. Rep. 360, 370 (1988) (Court report) ("As to the validity of the confessions ob-
tained by the police, including Mr. Martinez Vendrell's, [the Supreme Court] noted that
the alleged defects related solely to the findings of fact and accordingly did not give rise to
the procedural irregularity complained of, which related only to points of law.").
130. The defendants challenged their convictions before the Supreme Court on the
ground that there had been no "confrontation of witnesses and accused." Id.
3. The Spanish Constitutional Tribunal
After the Supreme Court affirmed their convictions, the defend-
ants filed a demanda de amparo in the Constitutional Tribunal. Pri-
marily, they claimed that the legally acceptable evidence against them
was insufficient to justify a murder conviction, as opposed to a lesser
charge of the unlawful possession of weapons and explosives. In sup-
port of that contention, they argued specifically that the Supreme
Court had erred in relying on Vendrell's second statement, which
although contained in the case fie that had been introduced through
the por reproducida procedure,' 31 should not be considered probative
evidence. The Barberd case thus presented the Tribunal with a signifi-
cant opportunity to address the extent to which the constitutional
principle of oralidad had invalidated the inquisitorially oriented prac-
tice of unlimited reliance on the sumario.
Lacking a certiorari mechanism, the Tribunal in theory must de-
cide all cases filed before it "on the merits." Under the L.O.T.C.,
however, it possesses the power to deny summarily recursos de
amparo if they "manifestly lack content that justifies a decision by the
Constitutional Tribunal."' 32 Since its inception, the Tribunal has used
this power to deny hearings to all but a small percentage of the recur-
sos de amparo that reach it.' 3 Despite the salient issues it posed, or
perhaps because of them, the Constitutional Tribunal summarily re-
jected the demanda de amparo on April 20, 1983. The Tribunal char-
acterized the case as a fairly pedestrian claim of insufficient evidence,
an area about which the judgment of the judicial system was entitled
to great deference:
As the assessment of the evidence lies within the exclusive juris-
diction of the judges and courts, the Constitutional Court cannot
find a violation of this provision unless there has been a failure
to produce a minimum of evidence against the accused.
In the instant case, however, this minimum of evidence was pro-
duced, namely in the statements made with the assistance of a
lawyer to the investigating judge, the official reports on the
searches made and on the real evidence discovered and in the
facts as established in another judgment. The Constitutional
Court cannot therefore review the criminal courts' assessment
of the evidence.' 4
131. See id. at 372.
132. Eibert, supra note 11, at 449 (quoting L.O.T.C. art. 50).
133. See id. at 456-57.
134. Barberd, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 373.
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The Tribunal's action set the stage for the first case in which the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights ("ECHR") would find Spain in violation
of its obligations under the Convention.
B. Proceedings Before the European Court of Human Rights
On July 22, 1983, the defendants appealed to the European Com-
mission of Human Rights, 35 the entity then responsible for processing
and deciding which cases the ECHR would hear. 36 In their applica-
tion, the defendants claimed that the Spanish government had vio-
lated their rights under the European Convention because they had
not had a fair trial before an impartial tribunal. They further asserted
that their convictions rested on coerced confessions, and that "the
principles of adversarial proceedings and of equality of arms had not
been observed. They complained, among other things, that they had
not been able to have the witness Mr. Martinez Vendrell ex-
amined.' 13  The defendants based these appeals on Articles 6.1 and
6.2 of the Convention, which define the right to a fair trial and the
presumption of innocence, respectively.'
38
On October 11, 1985, the Commission found "admissible" the
Basque appellants' claims of an unfair trial and a deprivation of the
presumption of innocence-that is, not procedurally defective or man-
ifestly unfounded. The Commission rejected the appellants' other
contentions as inadmissible.1 39 A year later, in its report to the
ECHR, the Commission unanimously opined that there indeed had
been a fair trial violation under Article 6.1,140 and that thus there was
no need to reach the Article 6.2 issue of deprivation of the presump-
tion of innocence.' 41 The Commission then presented the case for de-
cision by the ECHR itself.'
135. See id. at 378.
136. See Gearty, supra note 6, at 90. For the changes in screening procedures adopted
since the Barberd case, see Andrew Drsemczewski & Jens Meyer-Ladewig, Principal Char-
acteristics of the New ECHR Control Mechanism, 15 H.R.L.J. 81 n.1 (1994).
137. Barberd, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 383.
138. See id. at 378.
139. Decision on admissibility is hardly a formality. Up until 1991, only 1038 of 17,116
cases considered by the Commission had been deemed admissible by it. See Gearty, supra
note 6, at 90.
140. See Barberd, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 392. Article 6.1 of the Convention provides that
"[i]n the determination of... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair
and public hearing... by an independent and impartial tribunal...." Eur. Cony, on H.R.
art. 6.1.
141. See Barberd, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 392. Article 6.2 provides that "everyone
charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proven guilty according
to law." Eur. Cony. on H.R. art. 6.2.
1. The ECHR Decision
Although they complained that they had not been able to ex-
amine Vendrell, the defendants did not expressly base their submis-
sion on Article 6.3 of the Convention. Indeed, in its report on
admissibility, the Commission never characterized the case as one
arising under provision 6.3, which entitles a criminal defendant to the
right "to examine or have examined witnesses against him .... 142
Nonetheless, the ECHR included the Article 6.3 issue, along with
those under Articles 6.1 and 6.2, on which the applicants based their
claims-an addition that proved significant to the case's outcome. 43
The ECHR began by considering the defendants' claim that they
had not been tried before an impartial tribunal, as required by Article
6.1. The defendants argued that the presiding judge, Mr. de la Con-
cha, had been replaced on the day of trial by Mr. Perez Lemaur, who
wore a Francoist insignia on his tie and cufflinks and displayed hostil-
ity to the defendants and some of the witnesses. The ECHR held that
the last minute substitution of judges, while raising a justiciable issue,
did not in itself cast doubt on the Audiencia's impartiality. Though
the change had "to be considered as regards its possible consequences
for the fairness of the trial and notably of the hearing of 12 January
1982," 144 the ECHR found that any specific objection to Perez
Lemaur had not been preserved by means of a contemporary
objection.1
45
The Court next reviewed the defendants' confessions. While the
Spanish Supreme Court purportedly avoided relying on them, the
ECHR noted that this "important item of evidence" had been "ap-
pended to the police report and was pivotal in the questioning of the
defendants by the investigating judges in Barcelona and by the private
prosecutor at the hearing on 12 January 1982. ' 1146 The use of this im-
properly gathered evidence therefore gave "rise to reservations on the
part of the Court." 47
142. Id. art. 6.3.
143. See Barberd, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 384, 387. The Court explained the inclusion as
follows: "The Court recalls that the guarantees in paragraphs (2) and (3)(d) are specific
aspects of the right to a fair trial set forth in paragraph (1); it will therefore have regard to
them when examining the facts under paragraph 1." Id at 384 & n.64.
144. Id. at 381.
145. See id. A claim "may be taken to the European institutions only after domestic
remedies have been exhausted; that is the internationally accepted tradition." Robert,
supra note 9, at 7.
146. Barberd, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 391.
147. Id.
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The ECHR then turned its attention to the conduct of the juicio
oral. It was troubled by the fact that the defendants had been trans-
ferred from Barcelona to Madrid overnight to
face a trial that was vitally important for them, in view of the
seriousness of the charges against them and the sentences that
might be passed, in a state which must have been one of lowered
physical and mental resistance.
Despite the assistance of their lawyers, who had the opportunity
to make submissions, this circumstance, regrettable in itself, un-
doubtedly weakened their position at a vital moment when they
needed all their resources to defend themselves and, in particu-
lar, to face up to questioning at the very start of the trial and to
consult effectively with their counsel.'
48
The ECHR noted that in its report on the juicio oral, "[t]he Com-
mission was surprised at its brevity in view of the complexity of the
case, [and] the considerable time that had elapsed since the occur-
rence of the facts and protestations of innocence made by the defend-
ants to the judges concerned. ' 149 The Spanish government's response
to this disquiet was factually accurate. They claimed that the juicio
oral was brief because it was the conclusion, not the essence, of the
process by which the defendants had been convicted. Thus,
[t]he Government contended that the length of a hearing de-
pended on the nature and circumstances of the case, and on the
attitude of the parties; in the instant case, the length was deter-
mined by the time needed to take evidence and to hear argu-
ment. There were two reasons why this whole procedure took
only one day: the hearing was the last stage of proceedings that
after two earlier stages of investigation and interim submissions;
and then, by adopting the 'por reproducida' procedure, the pros-
ecution and the defense agreed to admit the file on the investi-
gation in evidence without requiring the 1,600 pages to be read
out in court.' °
According to Spain, a Spanish criminal trial could consist-as it
largely did before the Constitution of 1978-principally of lawyers'
summations.'' The trial was thus a procedural phase at which the
sides argued the significance of proof already gathered during the ear-
lier inquisitorial stages of the proceeding. 5 This approach did not
148. Id. at 385.
149. Id. at 386.
150. Id.
151. See id.
152. Of course, if the juicio oral could be viewed as merely an opportunity to present
summations by counsel, the fact that the defendants were exhausted by their transfer from
Barcelona would not be of any prejudicial consequence.
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reflect the open and adversarial fact finding process envisioned by the
European Convention. As the ECHR commented:
In criminal cases, the whole matter of the taking and presenta-
tion of evidence must be looked at in the light of paragraphs (2)
and (3) of Article 6 of the Convention .... Paragraph (1) of
article 6, taken together with paragraph 3... requires the Con-
tracting States to take positive steps, in particular to inform the
accused promptly of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to allow him adequate time and facilities for the
preparation of his defense, to secure him the right to defend
himself in person or with legal assistance, and to enable him to
examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain
the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under
the same conditions as witnesses against him. The latter right
not only entails equal treatment of the prosecution and defense
in this matter, but also means that the hearing of witnesses must
in general be adversarial.153
The ECHR found most objectionable the Spanish Supreme
Court's judicial reliance on Vendrell's second statement.154 Although
taken before a magistrate, the statement constituted a classic form of
unreliable hearsay: a declaration by a suspect to the police in which
he minimizes his own responsibility for the offense for which he is
being investigated, and then attempts to shift principal responsibility
for a crime onto someone else. Such untrustworthy evidence must be
subject to the testing of cross-examination. 155
The ECHR noted that the absence of Vendrell could not be at-
tributed to the government:
It may seem regrettable that it was not possible to ensure his
presence at the trial on 12 January 1982, when the defense could
have examined him on an adversarial basis. The respondent
153. Barberd, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 387 & n.82 (emphasis added).
154. See iad at 390.
155. It is for this reason that the Supreme Court of the United States has deemed inad-
missible out-of-court statements, made during police interrogations, and thus not subjected
to cross-examination, in which one suspect in an offense implicates not only himself but a
co-defendant while minimizing his own liability.
[S]elf-exculpatory statements are exactly the ones which people are most likely to
make even when they are false; and mere proximity to other, self-inculpatory,
statements does not increase the plausibility of the self-exculpatory state-
ments .... Rule 804(b)(3)[the federal exception for declarations against penal
interest] ... does not allow admission of non-self-inculpatory statements, even if
they are made within a broader narrative that is generally self-inculpatory.
Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 600-601 (1994). Williamson was a statutory
decision, but the same considerations of unreliability undergird the general constitutional
prohibition on convicting a defendant on the basis of out-of-court statements, not sub-
jected to cross-examination, of his codefendant. See, e.g., Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530
(1986).
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State cannot, however, be held responsible for that failure, as,
when Mr. Martinez Vendrell was searched for by the police after
the Supreme Court had upheld his conviction on 10 April 1981
(the relevant warrant was issued on 24 April 1981), he could not
be found.156
Nonetheless, the Court viewed the use of the hearsay evidence was
unfairly prejudicial to the defendants:
The evidence of Mr. Martinez Vendrell, who had been set free
on June 1980, would have been of crucial importance, as was
noted by the Supreme Court in its judgment of 27 December
1982 . . . . The Court observes that the central investigating
judge did not even attempt to hear Mr. Martinez Vendrell's evi-
dence after the arrest of the applicants on 14 October 1980, not
only to confirm his identification of them but also to compare
his successive statements with theirs and arrange a confronta-
tion with the applicants. Admittedly, the latter could also have
requested an opportunity to examine him; but this does not ex-
onerate the judge .... In the end, the applicants never had an
opportunity to examine a person whose evidence-which was vi-
tal, as is clear from the Supreme Court's judgment of 27 Decem-
ber 1982... had been taken in their absence and was deemed to
have been read out at the trial ....
Given this language, one might have expected the ECHR to
render a seminal decision on the role of Article 6.3's right to examine
witnesses in ensuring the more general Article 6.1's right to a fair trial.
Instead, by a narrow majority of ten to eight, the ECHR found for the
defendants on their Article 6.1 claim to a public and fair trial in terms
that diluted the importance of the confrontation issue:
Having regard to the belated transfer of the applicants from
Barcelona to Madrid, the unexpected change in the court's
membership immediately before the hearing opened, the brevity
of the trial and, above all, the fact that very important pieces of
evidence were not adequately adduced and discussed at the trial
in the applicant's presence and under the watchful eyes of the
public, the Court concludes that the proceedings in question,
taken as a whole, did not satisfy the requirements of a fair and
public hearing. Consequently, there was a violation of Article 6
(1).158
The Court then unanimously rejected the defendant's claim of a viola-
tion of the presumption of innocence:
159
156. Barberd, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 390.
157. Id. at 390-91(emphasis added).
158. Id. at 392.
159. The ECHR had defined the meaning of the presumption of innocence contained in
the Convention as follows:
The presumption of innocence will be violated if, without the
accused's having previously been proved guilty according to the
law, a judicial decision concerning him reflects an opinion that
he is guilty. In this case, it does not appear from the evidence
that during the proceedings, and in particular the trial, the
Audiencia Nacional or the presiding judge had taken decisions
or attitudes reflecting such an opinion. The Court therefore
does not find a violation of article 6 section 2 of the
Convention.
160
2. The ECHR's Interpretation Of The Right To Confrontation
By basing their holding on factors specific to the case before
them, the judges in the Barberd majority reduced its precedential ef-
fect. Arguably, this restraint in imposing on member nations a uni-
form code of criminal procedure was a prudent exercise. 16 1 By
straying from the confrontation point that was obviously critical to its
decision, however, the majority sacrificed logical coherence.
First, while in most cases a delay in bringing the defendants to
court would be devastating to their ability to prepare with their law-
yers for the juicio oral, in the Barberd case this was probably not a
factor; as noted by the Court, the government's presentation at the
oral hearing was perfunctory. The defendants most likely did not
need more time to counter the state's case at the juicio oral because
no witness gave evidence which incriminated them at that proceed-
ing.' 62 Indeed, the basis for their conviction was not the evidence ad-
Paragraph 2 embodies the principle of the presumption of innocence. It requires,
inter alia, that when carrying out their duties, the members of a court should not
start with the preconceived idea that the accused committed the offence charged;
the burden of proof is on the prosecution; and any doubt should benefit the ac-
cused. It also follows that it is for the prosecution to inform the accused of the
case that will be made against him, so that he may prepare and present his de-
fense accordingly, and to adduce evidence sufficient to convict him.
Id at 387.
160. Id. at 392.
161. See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 5. Mahoney writes:
The Court's jurisdiction... is optional. Consequently, no useful purpose would
be served by the Court frequently imposing, through evolutive interpretation,
radical changes of direction on the participating governments... This preoccupa-
tion doubtless explains both the Court's frequent assertion in judgments that its
reasoning is limited to the particular facts and its avoidance of deciding contested
legal issues when there is no need to do so in the circumstances, even though the
point may be an important one in general terms for the functioning of the Con-
vention system.
Id at 77.
162. Thus, as to the belated transfer of the defendants to Madrid, the dissenters found
the delay regrettable, but found no way in which it "appreciably hindered the defense" or
"flawed the proceedings to the point of depriving the defendants of adequate means of
defense." Barberd, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 394 (Dissenting Op.).
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duced at the oral hearing, but that contained in the sumario, and it is
on the use of the sumario that a finding of an unfair trial should have
rested.
Second, the ECHR's summary of a fair trial violation blurs its
criticism of the Spanish court's reliance on the second Vendrell state-
ment. The ECHR's objection to the fact that the declaration was not
"discussed at the trial in the applicants' presence and under the watch-
ful eyes of the public"'16 3 somewhat misses the point. While society's
interest in open judicial proceedings would have been served by the
publication in court of all proof against the defendants, certainly the
essential unfairness of the proceeding would not have been mitigated
by a reading of Vendrell's declaration during the juicio oral. As the
majority opinion recognized, the core problem was not that the de-
fendants were convicted on evidence not made public because of the
por reproducida procedure; rather, it was that the defendants were
convicted on the basis of evidence, the credibility of which was un-
tested by an adversarial examination. 6" By obfuscating its ruling, the
ECHR judgment arguably could have permitted Spain to convict the
defendants again on the basis of the second Vendrell statement, pro-
vided only that it was read into the record at a more orderly retrial.
The ECHR majority would have done better by holding that reli-
ance on Vendrell's second statement was a clear breach of the Article
6.3 right to confront witnesses. The ECHR should further have held
that this violation deprived defendants of their fair trial right under
Article 6.1, since the offending evidence plainly affected both the
Audiencia Nacional and the Spanish Supreme Court's judgments. The
precedential basis for such a decision lay in Unterpertinger v. Aus-
tria,"'65 an earlier ECHR opinion cited in Barberd. In Unterpertinger,
the ECHR voided a conviction based on alleged victim reports to the
police, where those same witnesses were not available to testify or
face cross-examination at ensuing judicial proceedings.
66
163. Id. at 392.
164. See id. at 386-87. Furthermore, to the extent that the majority suggested that the
Audencia Nacional merely erred in relying on the statement without reading it aloud, it left
itself open to the dissenters' retort that the defense "agreed to admit the investigation file
in evidence without requiring the 1,600 pages to be read out in court" and that "nothing
prevented the defendants from analyzing and impugning [any documents in the file] during
the hearing." Id. at 395 (Dissenting Op.).
165. App. No. 9120/80, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 175 (1986) (Court report).
166. In Unterpertinger,
a law entitling members of the accused's family to refuse to give evidence was
held to have been applied in a way which infringed article 6. The accused had
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Such a ruling need not have prohibited all use of evidence taken
during the investigative stage from witnesses unable to appear at trial.
For example, such testimony from the pretrial stages of criminal cases
is commonly admitted at trial in the United States, provided it was
subjected to the adversarial cross-examination at the pretrial hearing.
Indeed, the ECHR decision recognized that even Spanish criminal
procedure permits an investigating judge to convene a confrontation
between an accused and the witnesses against him, 67 and suggested
that, had such a procedure been used in this case, the resulting evi-
dence would have been admissible.
Nor would a new trial order based on the violation of Article 6.3
have required a holding that all statements not subjected to cross-ex-
amination are inadmissible per se during trial proceedings. For exam-
ple, the Supreme Court of the United States has interpreted the
Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution to permit the
admission of statements of unavailable witnesses, provided the state-
ments carry an indicia of reliability sufficient to moot the need for
cross-examination. 61 The ECHR could thus have ruled simply that
the state may not use statements of criminal suspects, given their ge-
neric unreliability, 169 to convict anyone other than the declarant, un-
less the statements are subjected to the testing of adversarial
examination by the party against whom they are to be admitted. The
party would of course have the option of representation at such an
examination.
Since Barberd, the ECHR has issued a series of decisions but-
tressing the conclusion that the right to confront adverse witnesses in
been charged with causing bodily harm to his stepdaughter and his wife, both of
whom reported him to the police but then refused to give evidence in court.
Gearty, supra note 6, at 104 n.77.
167. See Barberd, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 387-88. See also L.E. CRiM. §§ 451-55 (defining
the procedure of the careo, or pretrial confrontation of witnesses and defendant). See also
GONMZ-COLOMER, supra note 28, at 185.
168. The United States Supreme Court has stated that a constitutional challenge to the
admission of an out-of-court statement introduced for the truth of what it asserts can be
overcome when the statement "bears adequate 'indicia of reliability.' Reliability can be
inferred without more where the evidence 'falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.'
[Otherwise,] the evidence must be excluded absent a showing of 'particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness."' Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 814-15 (1990) (quoting Ohio v. Rob-
erts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980)). See also Imwinkelried, supra note 38, at 524 ("All courts
agree that to satisfy the dictates of the Confrontation Clause, the prosecution must comply
with a reliability requirement. The prosecution may do so by demonstrating either the
reliability of the hearsay statement itself or the hearsay declarant's availability at trial.").
169. The United States Supreme Court "has spoken with one voice in declaring pre-
sumptively unreliable accomplices' confessions that incriminate defendants." Lee v. Illi-
nois, 476 U.S. 530, 541 (1986).
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front of the trier of fact is an important component of a fair trial. In
the case of Kostovski v. Netherlands,17 for instance, witnesses were
permitted to give declarations against the defendant anonymously.
The defendant never had an opportunity to confront or question the
witnesses themselves, and at trial could only question those who took
the witnesses' declarations. This anonymous testimony formed the
basis upon which the defendant was convicted. The ECHR found that
this procedure was a violation of the Convention's fair trial right.
While much of the Court's reasoning in Kostovski focussed on the
difficulty of challenging the credibility of anonymous witnesses (em-
phasizing the need to test that credibility through questioning in front
of the trier of fact), the Court observed that because trial judges are
precluded from studying the comportment of anonymous witnesses,
they are unable to form an opinion as to the witnesses' credibility.
17 1
Similarly, in Windisch v. Austria72 and Delta v. France,'73 the Court
found violations of the Article 6.3 right to examine witnesses which in
turn deprived the defendants of the 6.1 fair trial right.174
The ECHR again confronted the issue of the admissibility of un-
available witness testimony in Isgro v. Italy.7 In Isgro, when inter-
viewed by the police, a Mr. D accused Isgro ("defendant") of having
participated in a kidnapping in which the victim died; D claimed the
defendant had asked him to participate as well, but that he had re-
fused. The defendant, however, claimed D had asked him to partici-
pate in the kidnapping, but he had declined. D repeated his
statements before the investigating magistrate, who then arranged a
confrontation before him between D and the defendant. 76 Under
Italian law at that time, however, neither the prosecutor nor defense
counsel had the right to be present at the confrontation.
During the transcribed confrontation before the magistrate, D af-
firmed his allegations. The defendant again denied them, accusing D
170. App. No. 11454/85, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 434 (1989) (Court report).
171. See id. at 448.
172. App. No. 12489/86, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 281 (1990) (Court report).
173. App. No. 11444/85, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 574 (1990) (Court report).
174. In other cases, however, an ECHR majority has held over vigorous dissent that a
court's reliance on other evidence than the statement of the absent witness to convict cured
any deprivation of the defendant's right to confront the absent witness. See, e.g., Artner v.
Austria, 13 H.R.LJ. 461 (1992); Asch v. Austria, 12 H.R.L.J. 203, 205 (1991) (majority
distinguishes Unterpertinger and Delta on basis of corroborating medical evidence of state-
ment to police by witness who refused to testify at trial that she had been assaulted by
defendant).
175. 21 H.R.L.J. 100 (1991).
176. See id. at 101.
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of lying due to animosity generated by past incidents between them.
A similar confrontation took place between D and one of the code-
fendants. At trial, D could not be located and, over defense objection,
the record of his statements to the magistrate and confrontations with
the defendants were read into the record. Following his conviction
and unsuccessful appeal, the defendant took his case to the ECHR,
claiming a violation of his rights to a fair trial and to examine the
witnesses against him.
In its opinion, the ECHR characterized Kostovski as standing for
the proposition that the rights contained in paragraphs 3(d) and 1 of
Article 6 "[a]s a rule,... require that the defendant be given an ade-
quate and proper opportunity to challenge and question a witness
against him, either when he was making his statements or at a later
stage of the proceedings." '177 The ECHR noted, however, that "the
use as evidence of statements obtained at the pre-trial stage is not in
itself inconsistent with paragraphs 3(d) and 1 of Article 6, provided
the rights of the defense have been respected."' 78 Overruling the
Commission, which had voted 10 to 3 in favor of a finding of a viola-
tion of Article 6 sections 1 and 3(d), the ECHR distinguished its ear-
lier precedents in Kostovski, Windisch, and Delta,7 9 largely on the
basis that, unlike the defendants in those cases, Isgro himself had been
able to confront the witness against him:
In the case under examination the purpose of the confrontation
did not render the presence of Mr. Isgro's lawyer indispensable;
since it was open to the applicant to put questions and to make
comments himself, he enjoyed the guarantees secured under Ar-
ticle 6 § 3(d) to a sufficient extent. The Court draws attention to
the fact that during the trial the applicant's lawyer was able to
carry out his brief with knowledge not only of Mr. D's allega-
tions, but also of his identity; he thus could challenge the accu-
racy of those allegations and the credibility of the witness
himself. In sum, any limitations which may have been imposed
on the rights of the defense were not such as to deprive him of a
fair trial.
80
Isgro's holding that the Convention's right to examine witnesses
does not necessarily include a concomitant right to have counsel con-
duct this examination certainly seems parsimonious by common law
standards. Nonetheless, the Barberd decision could have rested on
the confrontation point even in light of Isgro, since the defendants in
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Spain had no opportunity to confront and question Vendrel, with or
without counsel. In any event, under Spanish law a right to examine
witnesses would necessarily produce a right to have such examination
conducted by a defendant's counsel; by constitutional and statutory
provision, Spain guarantees a criminal defendant the right to have his
counsel participate at all pretrial proceedings. 8'
Though "extremely narrow," the decision in Barberd has been
viewed as "important" and "courageous."' 82 Ultimately, Barberd
made several broad statements about the nature of the trial required
by the Convention, particularly in a serious and politically-charged
case. First, the majority was not disposed to accept a judgment ob-
tained through a coerced confession, even if there was other evidence
in the record sufficient to support the judgment. 83 Second, the ma-
jority was troubled by a perfunctory public hearing in a matter of sub-
stantial evidentiary complexity. Third, the majority found
unsatisfactory a process in which the key pieces of evidence entered
the record as part of an undifferentiated mass of documents without
discussion or analysis, much less the presence and examination of the
key prosecution witness.
The majority thus determined that the Convention required that
a trial be the pivotal event in the adjudicative process, i.e., the stage at
which all of the evidence is tested by an adversarial process. The dis-
sent, however, was willing to accept a proceeding rooted in the civil
181. See Go=sz COLOMER, supra note 28, at 66 (citing C.E. arts. 17.3, 24.1, & 24.2).
See also BarberA, Messegu6 and Jabardo v. Spain, App. Nos. 10588/83-10590/83, 11 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 360, 374 (1988) (Court report): "Since the reform of 4 December 1978 (Act 53/
1978), the adversarial nature of criminal proceedings applies to the investigation stage; this
enables the accused, assisted by his advocate, to intervene in respect of steps concerning
him." (citing Articles 118 & 302).
182. Gearty, supra note 6, at 103 n.281, 104.
183. In a recent decision, the ECHR considered a twist on the facts of Barberd:
whether a court denied a defendant a fair trial by relying not on a confession taken from
that defendant while he lacked access to counsel, but on the defendant's refusal to answer
questions during a period when he was denied an attorney. In Murray v. United Kingdom,
17 H.R.L.J. 39 (1996), the ECHR held that a British court did not deny a suspected I.R.A.
member accused of unlawful imprisonment a fair trial under the Convention simply by
relying on his silence during post-arrest interrogation by the police, a reliance authorized
by special anti-terrorist legislation directed at Northern Ireland. (Such reliance would
plainly not be permitted under the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination.
See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976)).
The ECHR went on to hold, however, that because the decision to remain silent could
result in a conviction, the defendant was entitled to have the advice of counsel in making it,
and the failure to provide Murray with counsel during his post-arrest interrogation, when
combined with the court's reliance on his ensuing silence, did deprive him of the fair trial
guaranteed by the Convention. See Murray, 17 H.R.L.J. at 47. Like Barberd, Murray
reaches a correct result by reliance on case-specific facts rather than a general principle.
law tradition of written and documentary evidence, culminating in a
relatively brief hearing to discuss the adequacy of previously gathered
evidence. The rejection of the latter view in favor of the former is a
significant victory for the Europeanization of the adversarial process.
The ECHR majority opinion may also have been driven by a
quasi-political imperative. In 1982, the year that the convictions of the
Barbera defendants were returned and affirmed by the Spanish judi-
cial system, Spain "still suffer[ed] from the tragic wounds of a long
and repressive dictatorship. People still [went] to jail for writing polit-
ically sensitive newspaper articles."'" Barberd can be viewed as a
pointed message to a relatively recent signatory nation: the Conven-
tion's protections ought not merely be formally reflected in domestic
legal provisions, as they surely are in Spain's Constitution of 1978.
Rather, they must be honored in spirit and practice, even-or espe-
cially-in a controversial case involving allegations of political
violence.
C. Round Two: The Case in Spain
The judgment rendered by the ECHR in the Barberd case was
declaratory, and nothing more. It did not void the defendants' convic-
tions, much less open the prison gates for Barber and Messegu6, who
remained in custody. Indeed, only a Spanish court or tribunal could
provide such a remedy.'85 In 1991, a survey of the effect of ECHR
184. Eibert, supra note 11, at 437. Mark Eibert, the author of this seminal note on the
founding of the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal, may well have been referring to the case
of Miguel Castells, which eventually also would produce an ECHR judgment finding a
violation of the Convention by Spain. See Castells v. Spain, 13 H.R.L.J. 427 (1992).
In 1979, Castells, a senator elected as a member of the Basque coalition Herri Bat-
suna, generally regarded as the political arm of the violent separatist ETA organization,
published an article accusing the government of involvement in an unacknowledged "dirty
war" against terrorists that had resulted in the killing of innocent Basque citizens by under-
cover police operatives. In 1983, Castells was convicted and sentenced to a year in prison
under a Francoist statute (now repealed) prohibiting insults to the government, after the
Spanish Supreme Court ruled that the truth of Castells' allegations could not be pled or
proven as a defense to the charges.
The ECHR found "that such an interference in the exercise of the applicant's freedom
of expression was not necessary in a democratic society" and thus constituted a violation of
Article 10 of the Convention. Spain was ordered to pay Castells $30,000 in costs. Id. at 435.
For a discussion of the ECHR's jurisprudence on freedom of expression, see Gearty, supra
note 6, at 115-25.
185. See Robert, supra at note 9, at 8:
In domestic law, a sovereign act held to be unconstitutional will be declared null
and void. The same cannot apply to the European Court, which cannot annul the
act of the defendant State or set aside a judgment given in one of its courts. All
the Strasbourg bodies can do is give declaratory judgments, recording that this or
that provision of the Convention has been violated by a specified act of a speci-
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judgments on the domestic law of party nations observed: "So far
there has been no case law [in Spain] concerning the review of pro-
ceedings following a finding by the European Court of a breach of the
ECHR in domestic procedure."'18 6 After noting that Spain's law of
criminal procedure did not appear to permit reopening a judgment in
such a circumstance, the authors predicted that "the Barberd, Mes-
segug, and Jabardo case will give the Spanish courts an opportunity to
consider this question."'"
1. The Audiencia Nacional
On June 29, 1989, the Audencia Nacional issued an order in the
Barberd case stating that the Spanish Supreme Court was the appro-
priate body to review the impact of the ECHR judgment. Until such a
hearing could take place, the Audencia released the defendants on the
condition that they report twice a month to their local court, and that
they not leave the country.'88
2. The Spanish Supreme Court
On April 4, 1990, the Spanish Supreme Court held that Spanish
law provided no means by which to reopen a conviction on the basis
of an ECHR judgment; therefore, it ordered Barbera and Messegu6
back into custody. As recapitulated by the Constitutional Tribunal in
its later opinion, the Supreme Court reasoned that ECHR sentences
are not self-executing and therefore only declarative in effect. Only a
statutory appeal can nullify a member nation's judicial order, and no
such appeal was available following the Spanish Supreme Court's ear-
lier final judgment. Judgments of the ECHR have no direct effect or
execution in the Spanish judicial system, which does not contemplate
the execution of international sentences, as opposed to those of tribu-
nals of foreign states. Furthermore, the ECHR is not a supernational
judicial body, as Article 46 of the Convention prohibits giving it the
effect of a national tribunal of ultimate jurisdiction.8 9
fled authority, but ordering no special measures having a direct impact on the act
or the legal basis for it. A person convicted in a manner held at Strasbourg to be
contrary to the Convention remains convicted, and the law under which he was
convicted remains in force. It is solely for the defendant State to annul the act
and eliminate its consequences.
Id.
186. Polakiewicz & Jacob-Foltzer, supra note 5, at 133.
187. Id. at 134.
188. See S.T.C., Dec. 16, 1991 (B.O.E., 245/1991, 777, 779) ("S.T.C. 245/1991").
189. See id. at 781.
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In its decision, the Supreme Court suggested that it might be use-
ful to create a procedural mechanism by which it could comply with
an ECHR judgment. In the absence of such legislation, however, the
Court had to declare the impossibility of executing a sentence of the
ECHR. Barring such action, the only remedy available to the peti-
tioners would be a pardon or an action for money damages against the
Spanish state, based on the judgment of the ECHR.190
3. The Constitutional Tribunal
On April 17, 1990, less than two weeks after the Supreme Court's
decision, BarberA interposed a demanda de amparo before the Consti-
tutional Tribunal contending that the Supreme Court's refusal to
honor the ECHR judgment, was itself violative of the Constitution.191
The Tribunal accepted the case for full argument on July 12, 1990.12
In an order of July 18, 1990, the Constitutional Tribunal suspended the
execution of the Supreme Court's order, thereby leaving in effect the
order of the Audienca Nacional releasing the defendants from their
sentences.
193
While the petitioners' claim that the ECHR judgment had to be
enforced domestically was one of first impression for the Tribunal, its
members were already quite familiar with the application of both
Convention provisions and ECHR case law. By 1991, it had been ob-
served that:
The Strasbourg organ's practice plays an important role in Span-
ish constitutional case-law. On the one hand, the Convention is
the human rights instrument most frequently invoked in case-
law applying Article 10 §2 of the Spanish Constitution. More-
over, when the Constitutional Court cites the Convention[,] it
regularly refers to European Court judgments interpreting the
ECHR provision at issue .... In this way the case-law of the
Strasbourg court has become directly relevant to the interpreta-
tion of the Spanish Constitution.
194
190. See id. at 782.
191. See id. at 781.
192. See id. at 783.
193. See JACOBO LOPEZ BARAJA DE QUIROJA, EL CONVENIO, EL TRiumAL EURopEo
Y EL DERECHO A UN Jurcio JusTo 18 (1991).
194. Polakiewicz & Jacob-Foltzer, supra note 5, at 134. The authors note that in "its
influential Judgment 145/1988," the Constitutional Tribunal relied on the ECHR's decision
in De Cubber v. Belgium, App. No. 9186/80, 7 Eur. H.R. 236 (1984) (Court report), in
declaring unconstitutional a law which permitted summary proceedings for minor offenses
in which an investigating judge could also serve as a trial judge. "Its judgment led to a
legislative reform which brought this part of the criminal procedure into line with the re-
quirements of both the European Court's and the Constitutional Court's case-law." Po-
lakiewicz & Jacob-Foltzer, supra note 5, at 135.
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The Constitutional Tribunal, sitting en banc, 95 granted relief to
the petitioners on December 16, 1991.196 Magistrate Miguel Rodri-
guez-Pinero y Bravo-Ferrer, joined by nine of his colleagues, penned
the opinion. Magistrate Jesus Leguina Villa filed a separate concur-
rence, and a dissenting opinion was written by Magistrate Jose
Vincente Gimeno Sendra.
After discussing the Spanish Supreme Court's holding and the
parties' positions, the Tribunal framed the issue not as whether Spain
should apply the ECHR sentence internally, but rather whether the
challenged Supreme Court judgment had violated fundamental rights
recognized in the Spanish Constitution, the protection of which ulti-
mately lay with the Constitutional Tribunal.197
The Tribunal agreed with the government that Spain's recogni-
tion of the European Commission's right to hear complaints about
human rights violations and the State's acceptance of the ECHR juris-
diction did not mean that the judgments of the ECHR were more than
declarative. Indeed, the ECHR itself recognized that its judgments
were declarative and left each state to devise the methods of adopting
those judgments to its own internal system. 198 The Tribunal also
noted that the Convention neither introduced a supernational judicial
level, nor imposed on member states specific procedural mechanisms
of revision or annulment. 199 The Tribunal then stated that the fact
that a judgment of the ECHR did not have direct effect did not mean
that Spain's constitutional system should remain indifferent to the
body's findings, particularly given the provisions of the Constitution
concerning the status of international treaties and law."
The Tribunal noted that the Convention formed part of Spain's
internal law under Article 96.1 of the Spanish Constitution,20' and that
Article 10.2 of the Constitution further provided that constitutional
195. Amparos are generally decided by Salas, or divisions, of the Tribunal, but it de-
cides important cases of amparo as a full court. See Eibert, supra note 11, at 450-51 (citing
L.O.T.C. art. 10).
196. See S.T.C. 245/1991. For analyses of the decision, see Requejo Pages, La Articula-
cion De Las Jurisdicciones Internaciona4 Constitucional, Y Ordinaria En La Defensa De
Los Derochos Fundamentales (A Proposito de la STC 245/91; "Caso Bult6'), 12 REviSTA
ESPANOLA DE DERiEcHo CONSTrrUCIONAL 179 (1992); Escobar Hernandez, Problemas
Planteados Por La Aplicacion En El Ordenamiento Espanol De La Sentencia Bult6, 20
REVISTA DE INSTITUCIONES EUROPEAS 139 (1993).
197. See S.T.C. 245/1991, at 786-87.
198. See id. at 787.
199. See id.
200. See id. at 788.
201. Article 96.1 of the Spanish Constitution states that "the international treaties val-
idly ratified, once officially published in Spain, will form part of the internal order. Their
THE RIGHTS TO A FAIR TRIAL
guarantees should be interpreted in conformity with similar interna-
tional treaties approved by Spain. 202 As it was the ECHR's function
was to interpret the Convention, it followed that if it found a violation
of a right secured by the Convention, that violation could likewise be
considered offensive to the Constitution of Spain.2"3 The Tribunal
thus read Articles 10.2 and 96.1 as effectively incorporating into Span-
ish constitutional law the judgments and jurisprudence of the ECHR.
The Tribunal then turned to the question of whether there existed
in Spain's internal law a method to rectify the violation of a funda-
mental right found by the ECHR. The Tribunal emphasized that the
right to liberty (recognized by Article 17.1 of the Constitution) was at
issue;20 4 and that this violation could not be adequately remedied eco-
nomically.0 5 The ECHR's finding of a violation of 6.1 of the Conven-
tion necessarily meant that the prisoners were denied their Article
17.1 constitutional right to liberty; the judicial process did not provide
the defendants a public trial with all the guarantees which Article 24.2
of the Spanish Constitution supposedly ensured. Were the judgment
of the Supreme Court to remain in effect, the violation of the Conven-
tion and Constitution would continue.20 6
In ringing language, the Tribunal then affirmed that every public
power in Spain had an obligation to comply with the Constitution and
remedy any continuing violation of it-both because the Constitution
itself imposed such an obligation and also a democratic state would
suffer irreparably if it consented to a situation which violated the Con-
stitution's fundamental rights.20 7 Furthermore, monetary compensa-
tion would not be sufficient from a constitutional viewpoint in a
situation where the right to liberty recognized by Article 17.1 was at
stake.20
effect can only be nullified, modified or suspended in the form provided for by the treaty
itself or in accord with the general norms of international law." C.E. art. 96.1.
202. Article 10.2 of the Spanish Constitution provides that "[t]he norms relative to fun-
damental rights and liberties that the Constitution recognizes shall be interpreted in con-
formity with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the treaties and international
agreements concerning the same matters ratified by Spain." C.E. art. 10.2.
203. See S.T.C. 245/1991, at 788.
204. Article 17.1 of the Spanish Constitution states: "Every person has the right to lib-
erty and security. No one can be deprived of his liberty, except with the observance of the
procedures established by this article and in the cases and in the form provided by the
law." C.E. art. 17.1.
205. See S.T.C. 245/1991, at 789.
206. See id.
207. See id.
208. See id. at 790.
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In the Tribunal's view, by focusing on the ECHR decision's lack
of enforceability, the Supreme Court did not take into account that, in
accordance with section 10.2 of the Spanish Constitution, a violation
of Article 6.1 of the Convention also involves a violation of the right
to a public hearing contained in Article 24.2. That left to the Tribunal
the task of correcting the continuing violation of fundamental
rights.
20 9
The Tribunal declared that amparo is "at present the only remedy
available in situations of unconstitutionality caused by procedural
flaws exposed after the judgment is final, when no procedural remedy
is provided before ordinary tribunals. '21° In such a situation, the Tri-
bunal's organic law permitted it to nullify a final judgment.21'
The Tribunal joined with the Supreme Court in suggesting that
the legislature create procedural methods by which the ordinary
courts could enforce ECHR judgments regarding fundamental
rights.212 In the interim, the Tribunal decided that it would act to rec-
tify an acknowledged violation of fundamental rights.2 13
The Tribunal thus nullified the Supreme Court judgments of
April 4, 1990 and December 27, 1982, which in turn required voiding
the sentence of the Audiencia Nacional of January 15, 1982. Such ac-
tion placed the parties back where they were prior to the rights viola-
tion, meaning there could be a new juicio oral with all constitutional
guarantees afforded.21 4
Magistrate Gimeno Sendra's dissent sets in relief the seminal na-
ture of the majority opinion. Gimeno Sendra asserted that a grant of
amparo against the Supreme Court opinion denying recognition of the
ECHR judgment was unjustified; amparo, he wrote, is only appropri-
ate to remedy a violation of the law.215 As the majority essentially
conceded, the Supreme Court was technically and legally accurate in
holding that the Legislature had provided no procedure for vacating
final judgments on the basis of subsequent ECHR declarations. Since
the Supreme Court's ruling was correct, in Gimeno Sendra's view it
provided no legal violation which the amparo could remedy.
209. See id. at 791.
210. Id.
211. See id. ("As a consequence, Article 55.1 L.O.T.C. permits that final judgments can
be annulled by this Tribunal .....
212. See id. at 791-92.
213. See id. at 792.
214. See id. at 793.
215. See id. at 794-95 (Dissenting Op.).
The dissent, like the Supreme Court opinion it defended, consti-
tutes a classic expression of the civil law view that the highest source
of law is legislative enactment. 16 Since in this view a constitutional
guarantee cannot be enforced unless the Legislature has provided a
means for doing so,2 17 then it is statutory law that controls the Consti-
tution, rather than the other way around. The majority, however,
found in the Constitution the procedural means to remedy a violation
of a right created by that Constitution. In this perspective, the ab-
sence of a statutory vehicle to cure an injury to the Constitution is
regrettable and should be rectified by the Legislature, but it cannot
frustrate application of the Constitution's provisions. In perhaps con-
sciously echoing Marbury v. Madison,2 1 8 the Tribunal majority set the
Constitution, and thus itself, as the ultimate arbiter of the legality of
governmental action.
In addition to affirming and strengthening Spain's system of con-
stitutional control, the majority opinion promoted the adversarial na-
ture of its criminal trial process. By holding that the Convention had
been incorporated into the Constitution, the Tribunal read into the
procedural protections granted criminal defendants under Article 24.2
a right to confront witnesses not expressly stated therein. In one sense
this incorporation was little more than a formality because, as the dis-
sent noted, several years before the Tribunal had essentially prohib-
ited the use of the por reproducida procedure as a substitute for live
testimony, holding such a procedure violated the constitutional princi-
ples of oralidad and the presumption of innocence.2 19 The ECHR de-
cision thus gave the Barberd defendants an opportunity to enjoy the
procedural guarantees that, while extant in the Spanish Constitution
216. For the best primer on the civil law tradition, see JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THi
CivIL LAW TRADIMON: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CIVIL LAW SYsTEMs OF WESTERN Eu-
ROPE AND LATIN AMERICA (2d ed. 1985).
217. See S.T.C. 245/1991, at 795 (Dissenting Op.).
218. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) ("The government of the United States has been
emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to de-
serve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal
right.").
219. See S.T.C. 245/1991, at 796 (quoting S.T.C. 149, 150/1987. In S.T.C. 150, the de-
fendant had been reported to the police as suspicious by a witness; the police then found
the defendant under a truck with some burglary tools, with which apparently he broken
some store windows. The witness and the police gave statements to the investigating mag-
istrate. The defendant was convicted after a juicio oral at which he maintained his inno-
cence; neither the reporting witness nor the police appeared or testified, nor were the
burglary tools produced. The Second Chamber of the Tribunal granted amparo, finding
the lack of evidence at the juicio oral could not be overcome by reliance through the por
reproducida procedure on declarations in the sumario.).
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at the time of their first trial, had not doctrinally flowered until years
thereafter. 220
D. Round Three: The Case in Spain
The judgment of the Tribunal required a new juicio oral. On No-
vember 30, 1993, following considerable jockeying by the parties over
evidentiary questions, the Audiencia Nacional issued a judgment.2 2'
The Audiencia began its analysis of the case by citing those precedents
of the Constitutional Tribunal and the Supreme Court that required,
in accordance with the presumption of innocence and the principle of
oralidad, that the state provide sufficient proof to convict at the juicio
oral. The court noted that statements gathered during the sumarial
stage generally cannot serve as a basis for conviction.222 The court
further noted that this doctrine was subject to exceptions, such as
when a pre-trial deposition has been taken with the defense present to
examine the witness, or when a prospective witness unexpectedly
dies.223
The court then passed on the admissibility of various pieces of
evidence. The statements of the defendants at their prior trial were
admissible, as were the statements they gave with the assistance of
counsel at the sumarial stage.224 In contrast to its judgment 11 years
before, however, the Audiencia explicitly ruled that the defendants'
confessions during their incommunicado interrogation, which they
long had maintained resulted from torture, were inadmissible because
220. Thus Lopez Baraja, writing after the ECHR decision in Barberd but before that of
the Tribunal, could view the Barberd decision as consistent with existing precedent on the
right to confront witnesses under Spanish law:
In criminal matters, the right to a fair trial implies that the accused has to have the
possibility to challenge the evidence, which ought to be taken in an adversarial
manner between the parties. The evidence ought to be taken in a public session,
with the accused present and being able to question the witnesses. The impossi-
bility of interrogating witnesses should lead to the inadmissibility of their testi-
mony, as the formula of por reproducida is not acceptable. For this reason the
ECHR in Barberd considered that the fact that important proofs were not admit-
ted and challenged adequately at the trial, in the presence of the accused and
publicly, brings us to the conclusion that the proceeding, considered in total, did
not meet the demands of a process just and public, thereby violating Article 6.1.
LOPEz BARAJA, supra note 193, at 117-18.
221. See Audiencia Nacional, Sentencia No. 44/93 (on file with Hastings Constitutional
Law Quarterly).
222. See id2 at 18.
223. See id. at 19-20.
224. See id. at 22-23.
counsel had not been available to the defendants."- Vendrell's first
incriminating statement was inadmissible for the same reason.226
The court found Vendrell's second declaration technically admis-
sible under Spanish law, since it had been taken before a judge when
counsel was available to Vendrell, and since he now was unavailable
to testify for reasons beyond the control of the prosecution: he had
died in 1989.227 However, the court ruled that the declaration was of
little probative value because it had not been subjected to confronta-
tion and cross-examination by the defendants during the sumarial pro-
cess or at the juicio oral, and because it did not directly implicate the
defendants in the Bult6 homicide.22 In so holding, the Audiencia
cited the opinion of the ECHR on the same point.22 9
Thus, having whittled down the admissible evidence, the court
found that on May 5, 1977, five persons invaded the home of Jose
Maria Bult6, attached a bomb to his chest, and demanded a ransom;
the court also found that the bomb had exploded for unknown rea-
sons, killing Bult6.3 ° The court found, however, that the state had
not proved that Messegu6 or Barberi had entered the house or had
any other role in the operation or the making of the bomb-although
they were members of E.PO.CA. between 1968 and 1976.81 The
court further found that the state had not proven that Jabardo had
neither been a member of E.PO.CA. prior to May 9, 1977, nor that he
had gathered information for the group of businessmen and bankers,
in general, or Bult6, in particular .1 2 The three judge court unani-
mously acquitted all defendants on all charges.
At the time they arrested Barber , Messegu6, and Jabardo in
1980, the Spanish police had located physical evidence establishing
that all three were linked to groups advocating armed struggle against
the Spanish state. That being so, a Tribunal of Public Order under
Franco would not have been troubled by the likelihood that the evi-
dence tying them to the Bult6 homicide was obtained by torture and
thus unreliable, or by the very real possibility that the defendants
were innocent of the charged crime; innocent or guilty of that particu-
lar offense, prison would have been deemed a proper place for them.
225. See id. at 23.
226. See id. at 24.
227. See id at 24-25.
228. See i& at 27.
229. See iti
230. See id. at 14-15.
231. See id. at 15.
232. See id.
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Although the Constitution of 1978 should have mandated a very dif-
ferent judicial attitude and proceeding from those found in the T.O.P.,
there was little about the 1982 trial of the defendants that reflected
that change.
Eleven years later, however, the defendants were awarded a pro-
ceeding that certainly could serve as a model of procedural fairness to
criminal defendants. Statements from both the defendants and al-
leged accomplices taken without the benefit of counsel were excluded
from consideration. A crucial piece of evidence against the defend-
ants-the second declaration of Vendrell-was considered but
awarded little probative value because its reliability had not been
tested through confrontation and cross-examination.
It is finally of great importance that the court meaningfully ap-
plied the presumption of innocence. Certainly, the second juicio oral
did not establish that the defendants had not participated in the Bult6
homicide. The fact that a confession is coerced surely means it may be
false, but information obtained under duress can be accurate, and
often is. On the record before it, the Audiencia Nacional could not
have acquitted the defendants if it had assumed their guilt until the
contrary was proven. Rather, its judgment reflects a rather rigorous
application of Blackstone's maxim, adopted as a cornerstone of the
American criminal justice system, that "the law holds that it is better
that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer." 3
E. Article 50 Proceedings in the ECHR
The final chapter of the Bult6 case was written in the ECHR.
Article 50 of the Convention authorizes the ECHR to provide "just
satisfaction" to parties whose rights under the Convention have been
violated if the state responsible for that violation fails to make ade-
quate reparation. At the time of its decision in the Barberd case in
1988, the ECHR reserved decision on Article 50 compensation.
234
233. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 455-56 (1895). Coffin also quotes scholars
who found expressions of the presumption of innocence in Greek and Roman law, includ-
ing a story of a Roman governor who was on trial before the Emperor Julian. The accused
contented himself with denying his guilt, and relying on the lack of evidence against him.
The prosecutor Delphidius, seeing that the failure of the accusation, was inevitable, could
not restrain himself and exclaimed, "Oh, illustrious Caesar! If it is sufficient to deny, what
will become of the guilty?" Julian replied, "If it is sufficient to accuse, what will become of
the innocent?" l at 455 (quoting RERUM GESTARuM, lib. XVIII, c.1).
234. See BarberA, Messegu6 and Jabardo v. Spain, App. Nos. 10588/83-10590/83, 11
Eur. H.R. Rep. 360, 392-93 (1988) (Court report).
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On June 13, 1994, the ECHR ordered Spain to pay eight million
pesetas (approximately $65,000) to Messegu6 and BarberA, and half
that amount to Jabardo. This judgment has been satisfied3 5
V. Conclusion
BarberA is arguably the most important criminal case heard in
Spain's judicial system since the enactment of the Constitution of
1978. It is significant both for the changes that it wrought in Spanish
law and procedure and those that it reflected. The trial eventually
awarded the defendants was adversarial and fair, and placed great em-
phasis on the right of the accused to confront the evidence against
him. The 1993 proceeding in the Audiencia Nacional plainly was in
full accord with the guarantees provided by both Article 24 of the
Spanish Constitution and Article 6 of the European Convention.
Moreover, the decision of the Constitutional Tribunal in Barberd has
great significance in areas far beyond that of criminal procedure. It
affirmed the transcendental stature of international treaties in domes-
tic law and Spain's fidelity to its international legal obligations.
A nation's commitment to legal principle is continually subject to
testing and never is that challenge greater than when a society con-
fronts a very real challenge to its peace and security. Spain's young
democracy has never been free of such threat in the form of political
terrorism from ETA, the armed Basque separatist organization. ETA
has killed hundreds of military and police over the last two decades in
its effort to carve from the north of Spain a Basque nation; security
forces have responded with "off the shelf" operations that have in-
cluded the kidnapping, bombing, and killing of ETA suspects-and
innocent civilians?
3 6
While the ETA issue has waxed and waned in political impor-
tance, it took center stage again in the summer of 1997. In June, se-
curity forces freed a prison official held hostage in an underground
cell for 532 days by ETA in an effort to force a government relocation
of ETA prisoners.3 7 The public was shocked by photos of the re-
235. Conversation with Simeon Miquel Roe, September, 1995. Attorney Roe repre-
sented defendant Barber at all stages of the proceedings in Spain and the ECHR between
1982 and 1994.
236. In 1996, the government of socialist Felipe Gonzalez fell after 14 years in power,
largely over credible allegations that high government officials, and even Gonzalez himself,
approved funding operations in this "dirty war" in the 1980s.
237. See Julio M. Lazaro, El Comando Que Secuestr6 A Ortega Lara Tenia Ordenes de
Matarle 0 Dejarle Morir de Inanicion, El Juez Procesa Como Inductor A 'Pototo' y Calcula
Que A Cada Etarra Le Pueden Caer 20 Anos, EL PA.s, Aug. 19, 1997, at 13.
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leased official, whose cadaverous appearance resembled that of a sur-
vivor of Auschwitz. Immediately thereafter, ETA kidnapped Miguel
Angel Blanco, a city councilor in the Basque country who belonged to
the conservative Partido Popular, which presently controls the na-
tional government. When the government refused to accede to ETA's
demand for the transfer of prisoners within a few days of the coun-
cilor's capture, ETA executed Angel Blanco with a bullet to the back
of the neck.
The public reaction was swift and massive. Within a week, street
demonstrations unequaled since the country mobilized in opposition
to the failed golpe de estado of 1982 were held in every major city of
the country. Literally millions of Spaniards chanted "Basques, si,
ETA, no." The generally fractious political parties signed a pact to
isolate Herri Batsuna, the political arm of ETA that wields significant
electoral power in the Basque country. It would be hard to imagine a
political climate more hostile to an accused facing trial on charges that
he murdered a police officer at the behest of ETA.
Yet on August 4, 1997, presumed ETA member Jose Joaquin
Lizaso Sorozabal was acquitted of just such charges following his ex-
tradition from France a year earlier." 8 At his juicio oral on July 22nd,
the prosecutor had relied on police station statements taken from
Lizaso's co-defendant, who was convicted on the same charges. The
Audiencia Nacional found those statements inadmissible against
Lizaso because the co-defendant had not been afforded counsel. In
accordance with Article 24.2 of the Spanish Constitution, and likewise
the provisions of the Convention, the court further found that any
doubt about the defendant's guilt had to be resolved in his favor,
thereby requiring Lizaso's absolution. Article 1, section 1 of the Con-
stitution of 1978 asserts that Spain is "a social and democratic State
governed by law.. . ." Indeed it is.
238. See id.
